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ABSTRACT
This Article empirically investigates the corporate response to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine in the framework of the stakeholder capitalism debate. Some
describe corporate leaders’ decision to withdraw from Russia as an example of
stakeholder governance, maintaining that they placed social responsibility over
profits. Others question the authenticity of corporate support for Ukraine and
argue that companies left Russia mainly driven by operational and reputational
concerns.
Against this backdrop, we conduct an empirical study of reactions to the
outbreak of the war from companies in the S&P500 and STOXX600 indices. We
explore whether managers effectively decided mostly on ethical and moral
grounds, or whether perhaps there was another possible channel. In particular,
we focus on assessing the role played by stakeholder pressure exercised on
companies to leave Russia.
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First, we examine whether revenue exposure to Russia was associated with
the corporate decision to withdraw or suspend Russian activities, and the speed
of the decision’s announcement. The findings indicate that firms which quickly
announced their withdrawal from Russia actually had little revenue exposure to
the country. Furthermore, we conduct a Twitter-based test of the virality of
boycott campaigns and examine their relationship with managers’ decision to
take positive action in supporting Ukraine and exiting Russia. Our analysis
shows that the decision to withdraw from Russia is significantly positively
associated with boycott campaigns. Finally, our research underscores
important differences across market sizes. The smallest companies in our sample
(mid-cap companies) are on average the most exposed to the Russian economy,
whereas the Twitter boycott campaigns concentrated markedly on bigger firms
(large and mega-cap firms).
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that corporate leaders
tend to promote stakeholder interests when they face potential reputational
damage that could affect shareholder wealth, or when it represents a good
marketing move, so called “woke-washing”. The analysis also supports and
reinforces the view that pressure from stakeholders – magnified by the use of
social media – can successfully influence the corporate decision to pursue
certain social goals and not only profits. However, our results highlight how
size matters in the stakeholder capitalism debate. Stakeholder pressure on
management can be an important and effective factor in achieving a socially
desirable outcome, but it tends to focus on large, high-profile companies, while
other market participants are left free to operate without this meaningful
managerial constraint.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, hundreds of
Western companies have taken the unprecedented step of withdrawing from
Russia. Some have suggested that corporate reaction to the war represents “a
dramatic example of stakeholder capitalism in action.”1
Currently, a heated debate revolves around “stakeholderism” and the need
for companies to be managed for the benefit of a broader set of stakeholders and
not solely with the goal of maximizing profits. Advocates of stakeholder
governance view the political process as incapable of addressing corporate
externalities; hence they rely on the discretion of managers to make business
decisions that increase stakeholder welfare. Among stakeholderism supporters,
different views are expressed on how to advance stakeholder interests. Some
posit that addressing social and environmental concerns is not detrimental to
shareholder value, but to the contrary, it is essential for maximizing long-term
shareholder wealth. Others believe that stakeholder interests should be

1 Jamie Gamble, Putting ESG in Action Starts with the G, FORTUNE MAG (Apr. 20, 2022, 5:45 AM),
https://fortune.com/2022/04/20/esg-sec-cyber-environment-leadership-corporate-governance-investing-jamiegamble/.
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considered, regardless of the effect on shareholder value, and they entrust
corporate leaders with weighing and balancing the constituencies involved. 2
Critics of stakeholderism argue that stakeholder interests present many tradeoffs that are hard to resolve, and that leaving corporate leaders without a standard
for choosing among competing interests simply insulates them from
accountability. They also claim that corporate leaders lack incentives to serve
stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value, and that negative
externalities should be left to governments.3 According to a different approach,
the shareholder primacy/stakeholder governance frame does not fully account
for the important and widespread shift that has recently occurred in the economic
and social preferences of stakeholders, which are now demanding to see their
social and political values accommodated in the marketplace. In this view,
managers’ choice and protection of stakeholder interests is the result of
increasing pressure on companies from several stakeholder groups to act in a
more socially responsible manner.4
Considering the corporate reaction to the war in Ukraine within this
conceptual framework, supporters of stakeholder governance claim that top
executives decided to divest Russian assets and partnerships to sever ties with
the aggressor’s regime, placing social responsibility over profits.5 However,
other factors might have played a role in the decisive corporate response to the
invasion of Ukraine. The severe economic sanctions imposed on Russia have
created a hostile environment for businesses to operate in, and Russian
retaliation has specifically targeted foreign companies, threatening to nationalize
their assets.6 Additionally, employees, customers and politicians have put
companies under enormous pressure to exit Russia.7 Public campaigns have
proved particularly effective after the publication by Yale University
management professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld of a list tracking corporate activity in
the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. The goal of the list is to push every
corporation to publicly commit to leaving Russia, encouraging boycotts of those
companies that defy pressure to do so.8 Finally, research based on the list shows
2

See infra sources cited notes 18-19, 36.
See infra sources cited notes 37–39.
4 See infra sources cited note 40.
5 Peter Essele, The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: A Lesson in Stakeholder Capitalism?, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 16, 2022), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/03/16/the-russian-invasion-ofukraine-a-lesson-in-stakeholder-capitalism/.
6 See infra Section III.A.
7 See infra Section III.B.
8 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Steven Tian, Some of the Biggest Brands Are Leaving Russia. Others Just Can’t
Quit
Putin.
Here’s
a
List.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/07/opinion/companies-ukraine-boycott.html (“ Our goal is
3
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that financial markets are also punishing companies identified as remaining in
Russia, while rewarding those that withdraw.9 Therefore, the authenticity of
corporate support for Ukraine has been questioned, with some seeing the
announcement to exit Russia either as a marketing decision to attract positive
attention from customers and investors, or as a response to acute pressure from
multiple stakeholders.10
This article examines the corporate response to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine through the lens of the stakeholder governance debate. We empirically
investigate whether corporate leaders’ decision to withdraw business from
Russia was adopted according to a stakeholder approach. Under the stakeholder
governance hypothesis, company executives were mainly driven by their ethical
judgements, wanting to condemn Putin’s assault and to promote peace in
Ukraine, even at the cost of deviating from shareholder interests. The alternative
hypothesis posits the existence of a different possible channel, such as firms’
exposure to Russia or operational and reputational risks. Our focus is particularly
on the role of stakeholder pressure − exercised through social media boycott
campaigns − in influencing firms’ decisions.
To test the two hypotheses, we begin by conducting a detailed analysis of the
different corporate reactions to the outbreak of the war, to see if it suggests a
pattern of stakeholder governance.
First, we review the different channels that impacted Western businesses
operating in Russia. The array of sanctions imposed on Russia, while allowing
most Western firms to continue their business in Russia, created certain
operational difficulties. Additionally, companies that decided to stay in Russia
started to face mounting pressure from multiple stakeholders. Both the USA and
the EU have witnessed an extraordinary public consensus over supporting
Ukraine and sanctioning Russia with severe economic measures. This public
support has translated into political pressure on Western companies to leave
Russia in order to avoid benefitting the Russian economy. People worldwide
have also used social media to monitor and punish companies that kept doing
business with Russia. Finally, the stock market also seemed to reward companies
that left Russia while penalizing those that stayed.

absolute, and some might even say extreme: Every corporation with a presence in Russia must publicly commit
to a total cessation of business there . . . Americans who are sickened by businesses’ indifference to the
bloodshed can make their voices heard: If the companies won’t boycott Russia, boycott the companies.”).
9 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld et. al., It Pays for Companies to Leave Russia (May 18, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4112885.
10 See infra sources cited note 52.
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Second, we document the different measures taken by Western corporations
in response to the assault on Ukraine: some companies promptly made a clean
break, some only suspended a significant or a minor portion of their business in
Russia, while others largely continued to operate as before. Furthermore, we
report the range of different public statements that corporate leaders released to
explain the reasons behind their response. Interestingly, we notice that they
referred to the interests of stakeholders both whether announcing their decision
to leave Russia or whether making the opposite decision to stay.
Then, we proceed with our empirical analysis.
First, we present the descriptive statistics of our sample, which consists of
the companies included in the S&P 500 and STOXX 600 indices as of February
23, 2022. We use FactSet’s Geographic Revenue Exposure (GeoRev) as a proxy
for companies’ exposure to Russia. We collect all tweets (including retweets)
related to boycott campaigns against our sample companies during the 60-day
period after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. With respect to the speed of
company announcements, we extract the announcement dates from the
designated project page at the Yale School of Management. Finally, we split the
companies by size, distinguishing between mega-cap firms, large-cap firms, and
mid-cap firms.
Second, we discuss the relationship between company revenue exposure to
Russia and the speed of the announcement to withdraw or suspend Russian
operations. The findings show that the average exposure to Russia of early
announcers is smaller than that of the non-early movers.
Next, we design a Twitter-based estimate of boycott campaign virality and
relate this estimate to the potential impact on company actions with respect to
leaving or staying in Russia. The results show a significant positive association
between firm-specific boycott campaign virality and the decision to withdraw
from Russia.
Finally, we find that the smallest companies from our sample (mid-cap
companies) are on average the most exposed to the Russian economy, while
Twitter boycott campaigns concentrated mainly on bigger firms (large and
mega-cap firms).
The implications of our results for the stakeholder governance debate are
threefold.
First, the empirical evidence showing that corporations quickly took a stance
in leaving Russia when they had little financial exposure suggests an attempt by
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some corporate leaders to engage in so-called “woke-washing”, which is defined
as “appropriating the language of social activism into marketing materials.”11
These “marketing” moves likely pushed other firms with larger exposure and
higher shareholder value at stake to make an announcement perhaps earlier than
they would have wished, given the complexity of the situation. The empirical
intuition is confirmed by our review of the corporate response to the military
assault. Despite exceptional public consensus over supporting Ukraine by
sanctioning Russia, references to the interests of stakeholders were made by
managers to justify not only the decision to leave Russia – consistent with public
opinion and the rationale of the sanctions, namely to thwart Russian abilities to
finance the war – but also the opposite decision: to stay in Russia. For instance,
some companies chose to continue operations in Russia – disregarding the risk
of undermining the premises of their governments’ sanctions – claiming the need
to supply essential goods to the population, but then labeled as “essential”
products that clearly could not serve that function. Other corporate behaviors
cast doubt on the authenticity of concern for stakeholders, such as the example
of JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs, which continued to trade Russian debt
after they announced their withdrawal from Russia.12 Overall, evidence from the
corporate reaction to the invasion of Ukraine supports the view that corporate
leaders tend to prioritize social objectives not for the purpose of attaining those
social objectives, but when they believe it maximizes returns.
Second, Twitter-based “virality” measures reveal the essential role that the
boycott campaigns played in convincing companies to cut ties with Russia. The
findings contribute to the literature on corporate boycotting, highlighting their
effectiveness in pushing companies to pursue social goals in terms of
communicating about people’s social preferences. Moreover, the empirical
evidence supports and reinforces the hypothesis that stakeholder pressure on
managers to respond to their social preferences can orient business decisionmaking. It also shows that academic work such as the Yale SOM list can amplify
the effectiveness of stakeholder pressure. However, we underscore the
exceptionality of the extraordinary public and bipartisan consensus that we
witnessed in the context of the war in Ukraine. When conflicts arise between
competing social values, the risk is that corporate leaders will resolve them not
to maximize social welfare, but in favor of stakeholders that have more leverage
11

Erin Dowell & Marlette Jackson, “Woke-Washing” Your Company Won’t Cut It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul.
27, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/woke-washing-your-company-wont-cut-it. See also A. J. Chen et. al., Beyond
Shareholder Value? Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Support for Black Lives Matter 1-65 (Rsch. Collection Sch.
Acct.,
Working
Paper,
Identifier
10.2139/ssrn.3921985,
2021),
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1952..
12 See infra Section III.C.2.
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in a particular situation. Therefore, we argue that stakeholder pressure is an
effective instrument to promote more responsible management, but it can only
complement and not substitute stakeholder-protecting regulation.
Third, our empirical analysis sheds light on the importance of market size in
the stakeholderism debate. On the one hand, the Twitter-based measure of
boycott campaign virality shows that stakeholders concentrated significantly
less on smaller companies. On the other hand, the sample descriptive statistics
report that revenue exposure to Russia is significantly higher among smaller
firms. In the framework of the sanctions – aimed at weakening the Russian
government’s ability to finance the war – companies with larger exposure that
continue to operate in Russia are those potentially more helpful for the Russian
economy and, in turn, more harmful for Western governments’ strategy to stop
the war. We argue that significant differences across market sizes highlighted
by our research might reflect the existence of a “Stakeholder Governance
Gap.”13 Stakeholders are most focused and willing to pressure large and highprofile firms, while smaller public companies are less scrutinized. Therefore,
corporate leaders of smaller cap companies are left free to operate without this
important managerial constraint, even when they can be as harmful for society
as bigger companies.
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows.
Part II surveys the debate on stakeholder capitalism. We begin by
summarizing how the dispute about for whom a corporation should be managed
has evolved over the years, distinguishing between shareholder primacy and the
stakeholder approach. We then proceed to discuss the current focus of the debate
on managers’ role in protecting stakeholders, and increasing stakeholder
pressure on companies to act responsibly. Finally, we explain why analyzing the
corporate response to the Russian invasion could inform the debate on
stakeholder governance.
Part III provides a descriptive account of companies’ reaction to the war in
Ukraine. We first investigate all the factors that might have impacted corporate
leaders’ decision-making: sanctions inflicted on the Russian economy, Russian
retaliation against businesses, public pressure, and the stock market reaction. We
then document the different corporate responses – with different levels, timing,
13 See generally Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Corporate Governance Gap, 131 Yale L. J. (forthcoming
2022) (terming “Corporate Governance Gap” as the stark corporate governance gap found between large and
small corporations, with the latter adopting governance arrangements less systematically and often significantly
departing from norms set by the former).
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and strategies for withdrawal from Russia – and the different explanations that
corporate leaders gave to justify their decisions.
Part IV contains our empirical analysis of the companies included in the
S&P500 and STOXX600 indices. We examined both revenue exposure to
Russia and external pressure from stakeholder networks to assess whether they
are associated with companies’ response to the military assault. Our findings
show that the companies which first announced they were to leave Russia were
less exposed to the aggressor country; and that a correlation existed between
boycott campaigns against businesses and their announcements to exit Russia.
Our study also shows significant differences based on firm size. The smallest
size category (mid-cap companies) presents on average the largest revenue
exposure to Russia, but at the same time received the least attention from Twitter
boycott campaigns.
Part V discusses the implications of our results for the stakeholder
governance debate. Taken together, our results, on the one side, suggest that the
discretion of corporate leaders in taking into account ethical concerns poses risks
of “woke-washing,” that is, using social activism as a marketing tool to obtain
positive returns. On the other side, the findings confirm that pressure from
stakeholders can influence the corporate decision to act in a responsible way and
not only for maximization of shareholder profits. However, our research also
sheds light on the importance of company size, suggesting a “Stakeholder
Governance Gap.” The smaller companies in our sample were significantly less
scrutinized by the Twitter boycott campaigns, despite being the most exposed to
Russia and hence potentially the most beneficial for the Russian economy, which
is the target of Western strategy to stop the war.
Part VI briefly presents our conclusions.
I. STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE
A. Evolution of the Debate
In the last few years, the hottest debate in corporate governance has been
whether corporations should be managed not solely for shareholders’ profits, but
also in the interests of other stakeholders.

10

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol.10

The question “For whom is the corporation managed?” is one of the oldest
in corporate law.14 In the 1930s, Professors Berle and Dodd discussed this
question in the Harvard Law Review,15 the first arguing that management
powers are exercisable only for the benefit of shareholders,16 the second
asserting that corporations should also serve a social purpose.17 In the post-war
era, the traditional and prevailing position has been that the purpose of the
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth (so-called “shareholder
primacy”).18 Yet, at the same time, a number of prominent authors have
continued to express their support for the opposing theory, the so-called
“stakeholder theory,” according to which the corporation must balance the
interest of all its stakeholders. 19
Recently, however, the long-simmering debate on corporate purpose has
become mainstream in both academic and practical discourse, reaching a turning
point. In addition to law and business academics,20 high profile business leaders,
lawyers, judges and politicians have all weighed in. In 2018, Larry Fink – CEO
of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager – issued a letter to all CEOs
exhorting them to pursue a social purpose, benefiting all of their stakeholders. 21
14 Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose,
76 BUS. LAW. 363, 363 (2021).
15 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932).
16 See Berle, supra note 14, at 1049 (“All powers granted to a corporation or to the management of the
corporation . . . are . . . at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of the shareholders.”).
17 See Dodd, supra note 14, at 1147-1148 (“Public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is
today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution
which has a social service as well as a profit-making function.”).
18 See Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine‐- The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, September 13, 1970, at SM17 (“There is one and only one social responsibility of business
– to . . . increase its profits.”); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962);
See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 3637 (1991); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
19 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247
(1999); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005); R.
Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (2nd ed. 2010); Lynn A. Stout, The
Shareholder Value Myth, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Apr. 19, 2013, Paper No. 771; Simon Deakin, The
Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business
Enterprise, 37 Queen’s L.J. 339 (2012).
20 See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD (2018); ALEX
EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: CREATING PROFIT FOR I NVESTORS AND VALUE FOR S OCIETY (2020); REBECCA
HENDERSON, REIMAGINING CAPITALISM IN A WORLD OF FIRE (2020); Leo E. Strine Jr., Restoration: The Role
Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to
Professor Rock, 76 BUS. LAW. 397 (2021).
21 See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK CORPORATE
WEBSITE (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (“Society
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In August 2019, the Business Roundtable (the “BRT”) – an influential
organization of CEOs of major companies – issued a new “Statement on the
Purpose of a Corporation”, signed by 181 CEO members.22 The new statement
committed to deliver value not just to shareholders, but to all stakeholders, 23 in
sharp contrast with the previous long-standing BRT statement that explicitly
embraced shareholder primacy.24 Despite being mostly aspirational, the BRT
statement was largely viewed as a major shift for corporate America. 25
Following the BRT, in December 2019 the World Economic Forum published
the “Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution”, seeking to mandate that all corporations have the
purpose of creating value for the benefit of all their stakeholders. 26 In the
corporate community, Martin Lipton – a distinguished corporate lawyer,
founding partner of the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz – in a series of
is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every
company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to
society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the
communities in which they operate.”).
22 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promotean-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
23 Id. (“Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future
success of our companies, our communities and our country.”).
24 See
Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance (September 1997),
http://www.ralphgomory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf. (“In The Business
Roundtable’s view, the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s
stockholders; the interests of other stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders. The
notion that the board must somehow balance the interests of stockholders against the interests of other
stakeholders fundamentally misconstrues the role of directors.”).
25 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 124
CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020) (describing how the new BRT statement was portrayed by media observers “as a
major milestone and a significant turning point.” The Authors instead argue, “the BRT statement should be
viewed as mostly for show rather than the harbinger of a major change.”); See e.g. Luigi Zingales, Don’t Trust
CEOs Who Say They Don’t Care About Shareholder Value Anymore, WASH. POST (Aug., 20, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/20/dont-trust-ceos-who-say-they-dont-careaboutshareholder-value-anymore/; Jesse Fried, The Roundtable’s Stakeholderism Rhetoric Is Empty, Thankfully,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON C ORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/22/theroundtables-stakeholderism-rhetoric-is-emptythankfully/; Luca Enriques, The Business Roundtable CEOs’
Statement: Same Old, Same Old, PROMARKET (Sept. 2019), https://promarket.org/the-business-roundtableceos-statement-same-old-same-old/.; Luca Enriques, The Business Roundtable CEOs’ Statement: Same Old,
Same Old, PROMARKET (Sept. 2019), https://promarket.org/the-business-roundtable-ceos-statement-sameold-same-old/.
26 World Economic Forum Davos Manifesto 2020, The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-theuniversal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/: (“The purpose of a company is to engage
all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation. In creating such value, a company serves not only its
shareholders, but all its stakeholders – employees, customers, suppliers, local communities and society at
large.”).

12

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol.10

memos and articles attacked “shareholder primacy” and declared “the advent of
stakeholder governance.”27 The questions of “corporate purpose” and
“shareholder primacy” have also become prominent among politicians and
policymakers both in the USA and in the EU, resulting in various policy
proposals that somehow require directors to make decisions in the best interests
of all corporate stakeholders, not only of shareholders.28
B. Current Status of the Debate
Behind the growing support for stakeholderism, serious and widespread
concerns undoubtedly lurk about the adverse effects that corporations impose on
stakeholders, such as employees, customers, local communities and the
environment.29 Large companies are powerful social and political institutions.30
They employ the majority of the workforce, produce goods and services that
consumers depend on, affect the environment we live in,31 and considerably
27 See Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020/. See also Martin Lipton,
The American Corporation in Crisis—Let’s Rethink It, Oct. 2, 2019; Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, Further on the Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L/ SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. (July 20, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/20/further-on-the-purpose-of-the-corporation/.
28 See: Elizabeth Warren, Accountable Capitalism Act, 115th Congress (2017-2018) S. 3348; See Elizabeth
Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-onlyto-shareholders-1534287687;
Bernie
Sanders Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan, ; and Marco Rubio, American Investment in the 21st
Century (May 15, 2019), https://senatormarcorubio.medium.com/american-investment-in-the-21st-centuryc915bf48c860. At the EU level, see European Commission, Sustainable Corporate Governance, Inception
Impact Assessment, Initiative, July 30, 2020. https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-anddemocracy/; See Marco Rubio, American Investment in the 21st Century (May 15, 2019),
https://senatormarcorubio.medium.com/american-investment-in-the-21st-century-c915bf48c860. (Describing
the EU level); See European Commission, Sustainable Corporate Governance, Inception Impact Assessment,
Initiative, July 30, 2020. . (Describing the EU level); See European Commission, Sustainable Corporate
Governance, Inception Impact Assessment, Initiative, July 30, 2020.
29 See Larry Kramer, Beyond Neoliberalism The Problem and Possibilities for Rethinking Political
Economy
(April
26,
2018),
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Beyond%20Neoliberalism%20by%20Larry%20Kramer.pdf; See A
New Deal for this New Century: Making Our Economy Work for All, NYU LAW (October 3–4, 2019),
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/icgf/events/new-deal-new-century..
30 Kelly Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1227 (2002) (identifying the Church, the State and the Corporation as the only structures able to assure
that power is deployed in the service of individual and societal flourishing. The Author states that corporations
are rivaling (“the state, and certainly the church, in institutional power and influence.”).
31 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to Help
American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase American
Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and
Encouraging Investments in America’s Future, 19-39 UNIV. OF PA. INST. FOR L. & ECON., RSCH. PAPER SERIES
(2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462454.
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influence the political process and public policy discourse.32 In a time of climate
change, racial injustice, and unprecedented economic inequality, a large
consensus maintains that corporations contribute to these societal problems,
imposing significant negative externalities on employees, communities,
consumers, and the environment.
Despite recognition of the need for corporations to internalize the cost of the
externalities that threaten the environment and society, the how question unveils
significant differences of opinion.33 Currently, in the corporate governance
domain, the main focus of the debate is on the role of managerial power in
protecting stakeholders.
Stakeholderism encompasses different versions.34 Some regard
stakeholders’ welfare as an end in itself, independently of its effect on the
welfare of shareholders.35 Others consider stakeholder interests in the belief that
doing so would advance the goal of maximizing long-term shareholder profit.36
Despite the differences, the common denominator is the idea that, in making
business decisions, corporate leaders should take into account the well-being of
stakeholders, rather than just shareholders.37
Critics of stakeholderism respond that inevitable and pervasive trade-offs
exist between and among stakeholders, and having the directors deciding which
interests to prioritize would suffer from the problem of political “legitimacy.”38
They add that managers have no incentives to promote stakeholder interests
beyond what would serve shareholder value, so that stakeholder governance
would hardly produce significant benefits for stakeholders.39 To the contrary,
32

Roberto Tallarita, Stockholder Politics, 73 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL. 1617, 1630, 1660 (2021).
Ruggie, John Gerard, Caroline Rees, & Rachel Davis, Making ‘Stakeholder Capitalism’ Work:
Contributions from Business and Human Rights (HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP20-034,
November 2020).
34 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance; supra note 24, at 108.
(Describing an analysis of the different approaches).
35 See, e.g., Mayer; supra note 19.
36 See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Grow the Pie: Creating Profit for Investors and Value for Society; supra note
19.
37 See Einer R. Elhauge, Essay, The Inevitability and Desirability of the Corporate Discretion to Advance
Stakeholder Interests, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1819 (2022); Martin Lipton et. al., Stakeholder Governance and
the Fiduciary Duties of Directors, HARVARD L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOV. (August 24, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/24/stakeholder-governance-and-the-fiduciary-duties-of-directors/;
Martin Lipton et. al., It’s Time To Adopt The New Paradigm, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26357.19.pdf. .
38 See Rock; supra note 13.
39 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance; supra note 24; Jill E. Fisch
& Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1309 (2021).
33
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critics claim it could end up being harmful, since it would lead to further
management entrenchment and would preempt legislative and regulatory
reforms that would truly protect stakeholders.40
There is also a third view suggesting that the shareholder-stakeholder frame
does not fully account for rising bottom-up stakeholder pressure on firms to act
responsibly.41 According to this view, managers’ ESG governance is the
response to acute social pressures from stakeholders with real leverage – these
might be consumers, employees, shareholders – whose primary concern is not
the stock price of the company.42 Stakeholders can push firms to act in a socially
responsible manner either by exercising their exit option (divestment and
boycott), or by using their voice (vote or engagement with management). 43
Voice is normally the preferable strategy to pressure companies to pursue social
goals, but exit campaigns are considered the most effective instrument in terms
of informing and changing people’s social preferences.44 The reason is that
corporate boycotts succeed by affecting companies’ reputation in the media
rather than demand for their products.45 In recent years, several stakeholder
initiatives have been able to impact on corporate governance. For instance, one
of the authors of this paper found that strong multichannel pressure from
investors, consumers, employees and regulators after the 2020 Black Lives
Matter protests boosted the racial diversity of US corporate boardrooms.46 Also

40 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, supra note 24; See also
Matteo Gatti & Chrystin D. Ondersma, Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder
Approach Chimera 46 J. CORP. L. 102 (2020).
41 See Michal Barzuza, et. al., The Millennial Corporation: Strong Stakeholders, Weak Managers
(September 6, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918443; Eleonora Broccardo, et. al., Exit vs. Voice (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper, Paper No. 694/2020 n. 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3671918
(“Our approach should not be confused with what Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) call ‘stakeholderism’.
Stakeholderism refers to a situation where, in making business decisions, corporate leaders take into account the
well-being of stakeholders (rather than just shareholders). In contrast, we are interested in analyzing how various
stakeholders (including shareholders) can persuade companies to act in a more socially responsible manner.”).
(“Our approach should not be confused with what Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) call ‘stakeholderism’.
Stakeholderism refers to a situation where, in making business decisions, corporate leaders take into account the
well-being of stakeholders (rather than just shareholders). In contrast, we are interested in analyzing how various
stakeholders (including shareholders) can persuade companies to act in a more socially responsible manner.”).
42 Barzuza, et.al., supra note 40.
43 See Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, supra note 40.
44 Id.
45 Id.; See also Liaukonyte et al., Spilling the Beans on Political Consumerism: Do Social Media Boycotts
and Buycotts Translate to Real Sales Impact? (Jan. 11, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4006546 (underscoring
boycott’s limited effectiveness at generating changes in actual sales outcomes).
46 See Dzabarovs et al., Boardroom Racial Diversity: Evidence from the Black Lives Matter Protests
(European
Corporate Governance Institute,
Finance Working Paper No. 789, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931332.
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significant was a climate-focused activist campaign conducted by a small, newly
launched hedge fund that managed to gain three seats on ExxonMobil’s board.47
C. A New Test of Stakeholder Governance
Recently, the Covid-19 pandemic has been considered as a good setting to
test stakeholder governance by both its supporters48 and its critics.49 We argue
that the corporate reaction to the invasion of Ukraine can also inform and
contribute to the debate.
On the one hand, the corporate response has been widely read as “a clear
signal that the world is pivoting toward a stakeholder capitalism model”50 and
as “a dramatic example of stakeholder capitalism in action,”51 with corporations
placing “compassion and value for all stakeholders before profit.”52 The reason
is that many companies took action against the military assault quickly, going
beyond compliance with regulations and sanctions, and even despite their
economic exposure to Russia. On the other hand, the authenticity of corporate
support for Ukraine has been questioned. Some see corporate leaders’ decision
to exit Russia as mainly driven by operational risks deriving from sanctions or
by enormous public pressure to leave the country, rather than by their moral
views.53 Furthermore, corporate leaders have been pressured to cut ties with
Russia from different stakeholder channels, including several boycott
campaigns.
47

The Little Engine that Could: ExxonMobil Loses a Proxy Fight with Green Investors, THE ECONOMIST
(May 29, 2021), https://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/76972?page=2410&page%5Cu003d2058=.
48 See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, A Test of Stakeholder Capitalism, 47 J. CORP. L. 50 (2021).
49 See Bebchuk et al., Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, 40 YALE J. ON REGUL. (Forthcoming
2023).
50 See Essele, supra note 5.
51 See Gamble, supra note 1.
52 Phil Rubin, Putting ESG in Action Starts with the G, WISE MARKETER (April 6, 2022),
https://thewisemarketer.com/loyalty-strategy/stakeholder-capitalism-is-finally-having-its-moment-stakeholderloyalty-is-next/.
53 Alan Beattie, Sanctions More Than Ethics Have Spurred Corporate Flight from Russia, Financial Times
(Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.ft.com/e97d-424f-a313-2bb0d1cb8181; Elizabeth Braw, How Corporate Boycotts
Could Backfire, FP (Mar. 28, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/28/russia-sanctions-ukraine-corporateboycotts-could-backfire/; See Fangzhou Lu & Lei Huang, Sanctions and Social Capital: Evidence from the
Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Mar. 24, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4108129; See Daniyal Ahmed, Elizabeth
Demers, Jurian Hendrikse, Philip Joos & Baruch Itamar Lev, Are ESG Ratings Informative About Companies’
Socially Responsible Behaviors Abroad? Evidence from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (June 30, 2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4151996.; See Fangzhou Lu & Lei Huang, Sanctions and Social Capital: Evidence
from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Mar. 24, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4108129; See Daniyal Ahmed,
Elizabeth Demers, Jurian Hendrikse, Philip Joos & Baruch Itamar Lev, Are ESG Ratings Informative About
Companies’ Socially Responsible Behaviors Abroad? Evidence from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (June 30,
2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4151996.
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II. CORPORATE RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION
On February 24, 2022 Russian armed forces invaded Ukraine.54 The largest
war in Europe since 1945 not only had a far-reaching impact on world
geopolitics, but also represented an exogenous shock for international firms with
Russian operations.55 The response from the private sector has been decisive and
unprecedented, with hundreds of companies voluntarily curtailing or halting
their business in Russia.56 The businesses that remained soon started to face
significant challenges, having to operate in the framework of worldwide
sanctions imposed on the Russian economy and under pressure of large-scale
corporate boycotts.
A. Impact of the Sanctions
After the invasion of Ukraine, governments around the world – including the
United States, many European countries, and the European Union – rolled out
increasingly severe sanctions against Russia that were likely to generate a farreaching effect on the global economy. These sanctions include banning imports
of Russian key strategic products, setting embargoes on certain Russian exports,
closing airspace to Russian airlines, removing several banks from the SWIFT
system, and freezing assets owned by the Russian state and by individuals
closely affiliated with it.
The objective of these economic sanctions is clear. The measures are
conceived as means to restore peace in Ukraine and to uphold “human dignity,
freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights,”57 without deploying
military forces. To this purpose, the aim is to impose on the Russian economy
consequences so severe that they would effectively thwart Russia’s ability to

54 Charles Michel, President, European Council, Remarks at the Joint Press Conference with Commission
President Von der Loyen and NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg (Feb. 24, 2022) (“Last night a cataclysm
shook Europe. Brutal aggression triggered by Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin against human beings. A largescale military attack on the Ukrainian people. This unprovoked and unjustified attack is unlike anything on
European soil since the end of the Second World War.”)
55
Marc Berninger, et. al, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Stock Market Reactions to Companies’ Decisions
in the Wake of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict (Apr. 20, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4088159.
56 Alex Kalman, et. al, No Longer in Russia, The New York Times (Mar. 8, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/business/companies-products-russia.html (“More than 400 companies
have withdrawn, at least temporarily, from Russia since it invaded Ukraine. Some have been there since the fall
of communism — symbols of the enduring power of Western culture and commerce.”).
57 Eur. Comm’n, General Questions Concerning Sanctions Adopted Following Russia’s Military
Aggression
Against
Ukraine,
(June
30,
2022),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/faqssanctions-russia-general_en.pdf.
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wage war.58 This means that, despite attempts to minimize negative
consequences for the Russian population,59 in order to be effective, sanctions
need to profoundly affect the economy and welfare of the entire country, with
an inevitable adverse humanitarian impact.60
1. Sanctions Imposed by the USA
On February 21, 2022, Putin recognized the independence and sovereignty
of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s
Republic (LNR) regions of Ukraine and sent Russian troops to these separatist
territories.61 In response to Putin’s decrees, the White House issued an executive
order stopping new US investment in, US exports to, or US imports from these
regions.62 The following day, the US Government issued additional sanctions
against Russia, including blocking by the US Treasury of two major Russian
state-owned banks and their affiliates critical to financing the Russian defense
industry.63
On February 24, in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the US Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed extensive
economic measures to further bar Russia from the global financial system. The
OFAC required all US financial institutions to close Sberbank accounts and to
reject any future transactions; it froze the assets of Russian banks VTB Bank,
58 Eur.
Comm’n, EU Sanctions Against Russia Following the Invasion of Ukraine,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eusanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine_en; See also Joe Biden, President, Remarks at the State of
the Union as Prepared for Delivery in White House, Briefing Room (Mar. 1, 2022) (“We are inflicting pain on
Russia and supporting the people of Ukraine. Putin is now isolated from the world more than ever.”).
59 Eur. Comm’n, General Questions Concerning Sanctions Adopted Following Russia’s Military
Aggression Against Ukraine, supra, note 57 (“Sanctions are targeted at the Kremlin and its accomplices. They
aim at weakening the Russian government’s ability to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine and are
calibrated in order to minimise the negative consequences on the Russian population.”).
60 See id. (For instance, among the sanctions imposed by Western governments, the freezing of Russian
Central Bank assets and depreciation of the currency will of necessity hurt the Russian people.).
61 See Chad P. Bown, Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline, Peterson Institute for International
Economics, (Jul. 1, 2022), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/russias-war-ukrainesanctions-timeline.
62 President Joseph R. Biden, Announcing Executive Order on Blocking Property of Certain Persons and
Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Continued Russian Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and
Territorial Integrity of Ukraine (Feb. 21, 2022) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2022/02/21/executive-order-on-blocking-property-of-certain-persons-andprohibiting-certain-transactions-with-respect-to-continued-russian-efforts-to-undermine-the-sovereignty-andterritorial-i).
63 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Imposes Immediate Economic Costs in
response to Actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (Feb. 22, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/jy0602.
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Otkritie, Novikom, and Sovcom; and it sanctioned thirteen major Russian stateowned and private entities as well as other Russian oligarchs. 64
On February 26, the USA, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and
Canada, announced joint action to remove selected Russian banks from the
SWIFT messaging system; to prevent the Russian Central Bank from deploying
reserves to undermine sanctions; to limit “golden passports” used by Russian
oligarchs; and to launch a transatlantic task force.65
On March 2, the US Department of Transportation and its Federal Aviation
Administration blocked Russian aircraft and airlines from entering all domestic
US airspace.66
On March 8, President Biden announced a ban on imports of Russian oil,
liquefied natural gas, and coal.67
On March 11, the USA, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan and
Canada, imposed new restrictions, including increasing import tariffs to
eliminate World Trade Organization (WTO) membership benefits, denying to
Russia borrowing privileges at the World Bank and IMF, and other trade and
financial sanctions.68
On April 6, the OFAC added two of Russia’s largest banks − Sberbank and
Alfa Bank − to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List

64 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive
Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs (Feb. 24, 2022),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608.
65 Leaders of the Eur. Comm’n, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United
States, Joint Statement on Further Restrictive Economic Measures (Feb. 26, 2022) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/26/joint-statement-on-furtherrestrictive-economic-measures/).
66
Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Will Block Russian Aircraft from Using All Domestic Airspace (2022),
https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/us-will-block-russian-aircraft-using-all-domestic-airspace.
67 President Joseph R. Biden, Remarks by President Biden Announcing U.S. Ban on Imports of Russian
Oil,
Liquefied
Natural
Gas,
and
Coal
(Mar.
8,
2022)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/08/remarks-by-president-bidenannouncing-u-s-ban-on-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/).
68 Press Release, White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: United States, European Union, and G7 to
Announce Further Economic Costs on Russia (Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/03/11/fact-sheet-united-states-european-union-and-g7-to-announce-furthereconomic-costs-on-russia/.
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(“SDN List”). The same day, President Biden also issued a new executive order,
prohibiting “new investment” in Russia by any US person, wherever located.69
On May 8, the OFAC announced new sanctions, including a ban on exports
of accounting, trust, and corporate formation, and management consulting
services.70
After the G7 statement of support for Ukraine, on June 28 the OFAC
implemented new measures, including financial sanctions on an additional 70
Russian entities and 29 Russian individuals.71
2. Sanctions Imposed by the EU
The EU responded to the aggression against Ukraine by imposing six
packages of sanctions against Russia, including targeted restrictive measures
(individual sanctions), economic sanctions, and diplomatic measures.72
The first major package of sanctions included an import ban on goods from
the areas of DNR and LNR, restrictions on trade and investments, an export ban
on selected goods and technologies, restricted Russian access to the EU’s capital
and financial markets and services, and travel bans and asset freezes on a number
of Russian individuals.73
The second package of sanctions included financial sanctions on Putin,
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, other individual Russians and
Russian banks, a travel ban on certain individuals from entering the EU, wideranging restrictions on trade in goods and associated services such as

69 Press Release, White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe
and Immediate Costs on Russia (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/.
70 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Takes Sweeping Action Against Russia’s War
Efforts (May 8, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0771.
71 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Sanctions Nearly 100 Targets in Putin’s War
Machine, Prohibits Russian Gold Imports (June 28, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/jy0838.
72 European
Council,
EU
Sanctions
Against
Russia
Explained,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-overukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/ (Sept. 15, 2022).
73 European Council Press Release, EU Adopts Package of Sanctions in Response to Russian Recognition
of The Non-government-controlled Areas of The Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine and Sending of Troops
into The Region, (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/23/russianrecognition-of-the-non-government-controlled-areas-of-the-donetsk-and-luhansk-oblasts-of-ukraine-asindependent-entities-eu-adopts-package-of-sanctions/..
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semiconductors and other dual-use goods, technology exports, and high-tech
exports.74
The third package banned transactions with the Russian Central Bank, and
overflight of EU airspace and access to EU airports by Russian carriers of all
kinds. It also added 26 individuals and 1 entity to the list of sanctioned persons
and entities.75
The fourth package prohibited imports of iron and steel products and the
export of luxury goods. It also banned new investments in the Russian energy
sector, transactions with certain Russian state-owned enterprises and provision
of credit-rating services.76
The fifth package contained a ban on Russian freight road operators and an
import ban on all forms of Russian coal, and on other products such as cement,
wood, spirits (including vodka), and high-end seafood (including caviar). It
expanded export bans to include jet fuel, quantum computers, semiconductors,
and other technology products and services. It extended the transaction ban and
asset freeze on four additional Russian banks, and banned Russian companies
from EU public procurement projects.77
The last package banned imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum
products with limited exceptions, SWIFT for three Russian banks and one
Belarusian bank, suspended broadcasting in the EU for three Russian media
outlets, and sanctioned an additional 65 individuals and 18 entities. 78
74 Eur. Consult Press Release, Russia’s Military Aggression Against Ukraine: EU Imposes Sanctions
Against President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and Adopts Wide Ranging Individual and Economic
Sanctions, (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/russia-smilitary-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-imposes-sanctions-against-president-putin-and-foreign-ministerlavrov-and-adopts-wide-ranging-individual-and-economic-sanctions/.
75 European Council Press Release, EU Adopts New Set Of Measures To Respond To Russia’s Military
Aggression Against Ukraine, (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2022/02/28/eu-adopts-new-set-of-measures-to-respond-to-russia-s-military-aggression-againstukraine/.
76 European Council Press Release, Russia’s Military Aggression Against Ukraine: Fourth EU Package Of
Sectoral
and
Individual
Measures,
(Mar.
15,
2022),
https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/15/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-fourth-eu-package-ofsectoral-and-individual-measures/
77 European Council Press Release, EU Adopts Fifth Round Of Sanctions Against Russia Over Its Military
Aggression
Against
Ukraine,
(Apr.
8,
2022),
https://www.consilium.europa
.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/08/eu-adopts-fifth-round-of-sanctions-against-russia-over-its-militaryaggression-against-ukraine/.
78 European Council Press Release, Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: EU Adopts Sixth Package Of
Sanctions, (June 3, 2022), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-saggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/.
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3. Russian Retaliation
As retaliation against the sanctions, Russia closed its airspace to airlines from
36 countries (including the USA and all 27 members of the EU),79 banned the
export of more than 200 products, and announced a list of 59 “unfriendly
countries”, which Putin demanded use rubles to buy Russian oil and gas still
flowing.80
Importantly for American and European companies, on March 6 the Russian
government issued a decree that provided the country with the ability to use
foreign patents without the consent of the patent holders and without paying
royalties.81 The decree expressly states that companies from “unfriendly states”
will not receive compensation and will be compelled to issue licenses to Russian
entities.82 Additionally, Russia has been advancing legislation – supported by
the Russian President – on nationalizing assets of foreign companies that leave
the country over its invasion of Ukraine.83 After Putin’s endorsement of the bill,
Russian prosecutors reportedly issued warnings to several Western companies
in Russia, including Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Apple, IKEA, Microsoft, IBM and
Porsche, threatening to arrest corporate leaders there who criticize the
government or to seize assets of companies that withdraw from the country. 84

79 REUTERS, Russian Flights Bans Hit Airlines From 36 Countries - Aviation Authority, (Feb. 28, 2022,
11:10
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-imposes-sweeping-flight-bansairlines-36-countries-2022-02-28/.
80 Patricia Cohen, Putin Says ‘Unfriendly Countries’ Must Buy Russian Oil And Gas In Rubles, The New
York Times (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/business/putin-russian-oil-gas-rubles.html.
81 See Postanovleniye Pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Decree of the Government of the Russian
Federation]
June
3,
2022,
No.
299,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070005?index=0&rangeSize=1.
82 Bruce Love, Russian Patents Grab Deemed ‘Act Of War’, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 15, 2022),
https://www.ft.com/content/1ee7a359-8561-4679-bc84-59f55157e9bd.
83 Evan Gershkovich, Russia Advances Law on Nationalizing Assets of Foreign Companies, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 12, 2022, 9:37 AM), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news2022-04-12/card/russia-advances-law-on-nationalizing-assets-of-foreign-companies-XT2HMh3ljjvy0magt318;
See also Evan Gershkovich, Russia Moves Ahead With Bill on Nationalizing Assets of Foreign Companies, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 24, 2022, 12:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latestnews-2022-05-24/card/russia-moves-ahead-with-bill-on-nationalizing-assets-of-foreign-companiesOQ8d2B8n2MlAdNKwQRKf.
84 Jennifer Maloney et. al., Russian Prosecutors Warn Western Companies of Arrests, Asset Seizures, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 14, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-prosecutors-warn-westerncompanies-of-arrests-asset-seizures-11647206193; See also Russian Embassy in USA (@RusEmbUSA),
TWITTER (Mar. 13. 2013, 9:38 PM), https://twitter.com/RusEmbUSA/status/1503183720664158208 (The same
day, the Russian embassy in Washington labeled the news as fake and tweeted that: “The decision whether to
continue entrepreneurial activity in our country is entirely up to the Americans. As well as the right to ignore
the russophobic hysteria that encourages foreign businesses to suffer huge losses in order to hit @Russia.”).
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4. Impact on Western Businesses
After the imposition of sanctions, most Western corporations – aside from
those whose business directly relates to sanctioned activities such as military
production – have remained free to conduct business in Russia. 85 Most of the
companies that left Russia were not directly affected by the measures.
Nonetheless, the array of sanctions has created an environment of legal and
financial hostility that has made compliance complicated and has often impaired
the ability of firms to continue their Russian operations as before.86
As for Russian retaliation, this affects firms very differently. For some
companies it entails a relatively light financial burden, such as losing leases on
stores or offices. In contrast, for businesses that involve expensive
manufacturing equipment or logistics assets, such as warehouses and fleets of
trucks, the impact is heavier. An example is represented by the auto industry,
which has featured among the biggest western investments in Russia over the
past 20 years, and has been hit severely.87 The effect of losing patent protection
or intellectual property in a nationalization will vary by company as well,
depending on the value of the patent or intellectual property in Russia. 88
B. Public Pressure
With the war in Ukraine dragging on, pressure for Western companies in
Russia to leave started to mount from several channels.
1. Political Pressure
Both in the USA and across Europe, the public overwhelmingly support
isolating Russia economically to end its invasion and occupation of Ukraine. 89

85 Tetyana Balyuk & Anastassia Fedyk, Divesting Under Pressure: U.S. Firms’ Exit in Response to
Russia’s War Against Ukraine (May 23, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4097225.
86
Alan Beattie, Sanctions More Than Ethics Have Spurred Corporate Flight From Russia, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/fed1ebb5-e97d-424f-a313-2bb0d1cb8181.
87 Evan Gershkovich et. al., Pressure Mounts for Western Companies Leaving Russia, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Mar. 11, 2022, 2:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pressure-mounts-for-western-companiesleaving-russia-11647006723.
88 Hannah Knowles & Zina Pozen, Russia Says Its Businesses Can Steal Patents From Anyone In
‘Unfriendly’
Countries,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Mar.
9,
2022,
8:19
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/09/russia-allows-patent-theft/.
89 Jura Liaukonyte, Foreign Companies Continue To Prop Up The Kremlin, THE WASHINGTON POST (April
8, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/08/russia-boycott-companies-ukraine/.
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In a strongly polarized and divided America, polls since the assault show that
people across the political spectrum agree on the nature of the threat and on who
is responsible for the war. There is strong bipartisan consensus on the need to
support Ukraine and to respond to Putin’s invasion.90
Europe as well is experiencing an exceptionally strong consensus in
supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia, with 79% of Europeans
interviewed supporting economic and financial sanctions against Russia (of
these 57% say they ‘strongly approve’) and 67% supporting the delivery of
military equipment to Ukraine.91
This broad public support has unsurprisingly resulted in political statements,
some of them related to businesses.92
The most relevant political pressure for Western firms has been intervention
by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who explicitly called out global
companies, urging them to exit Russia. On March 16, when addressing the US
Congress, Zelensky asked lawmakers to press US companies from their home
states to stop doing business in Russia, saying the Russian market is “flooded
with our blood.”93 In a separate address on the previous day, the President of
Ukraine took aim at specific companies still operating in Russia. He named food
companies Nestlé and Mondelez, consumer goods makers Unilever and Johnson
& Johnson, European banks Raiffeisen and Société Générale, electronics giants
Samsung and LG, chemicals maker BASF, and pharmaceuticals companies
Bayer and Sanofi, saying they and “dozens of other companies” had not left the

90 See Public Expresses Mixed Views of U.S. Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/03/15/public-expresses-mixed-views-ofu-s-response-to-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/; See generally THE ECONOMIST & YOUGOV, THE
ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL: FEBRUARY 26 – MARCH 1, 2022 – 1500 U.S. ADULT CITIZENS (2022),
HTTPS://DOCS.CDN.YOUGOV.COM/AA58IG9D3B/ECONTABREPORT.PDF
91 See Giles Finchelstein et al., EUROPEAN PEOPLES BEHIND UKRAINE, THE UKRAINIAN WAR SEEN FROM
FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND POLAND, (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.jean-jaures.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/03/UkraineEN.pdf.
92
See Paulina Firozi et al., Russian Vodka Boycotts Show Solidarity With Ukraine — But Will Have Little
Financial
Impact,
Experts
Say,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Mar.
5,
2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/01/russian-made-vodka-boycotts/ (stating in the USA,
several republican and democrat governors have restricted the sale of Russian vodkas in their states).
93 See Saabira Chaudhuri & Denise Roland, Ukraine’s Zelensky Urges Global Businesses to Exit Russia
in Speech to Congress, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraineszelensky-urges-businesses-to-leave-russia-in-speech-to-congress-11647448370?mod=article_inline. (President
Zelensky said: “If you have companies in your districts who financed the Russian military machine . . . You
should put pressure . . . I am asking to make sure that the Russians do not receive a single penny that they use to
destroy people in Ukraine”).
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Russian market.94 On March 23, in a speech to the French parliament, the
Ukrainian President pressed French companies still operating in Russia to exit,
arguing that continuing to do business in the country would have made them
“sponsors” of war.95
2. Boycott Campaigns
Western companies that continued to operate in Russia faced strong criticism
from consumers and their own employees. In support of Ukraine, people
worldwide started to call out big firms that had not left Russia or had not taken
a strong enough stance against the invading country.
The favorite venue for these campaigns has been Twitter. After the Russian
assault, countless tweets pressured companies that maintained operations with
Russia to cut their ties. Boycott hashtags targeting big multinationals quickly
gained attention and support.96
The boycott campaigns seemed to be effective, since some of the biggest
brands – such as Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and McDonald’s – were not in the first
exodus from Russia, but they left only after being targeted by internet activists. 97
For instance, Nestlé SA initially vowed to stay, but they then reversed the
decision after undergoing a pressuring Twitter campaign inviting people to
boycott their products.98

94 Pressure Mounts for Multinationals in Russia to Leave, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 17, 2022),
https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2022-03-17/pressure-mounts-for-multinationals-in-russia-toleave.
95 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, Speech At A Joint Meeting of The Senate, the National
Assembly of the French Republic and the Council of Paris, (MAR. 23, 2022),
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-spilnomu-zibranni-senatu-naci-73773
(“French companies must leave the Russian market. Renault, Auchan, Leroy Merlin and others. They must cease
to be sponsors of Russia’s military machine, sponsors of the killing of children and women, sponsors of rape,
robbery and looting by the Russian army. All companies must remember once and for all that values are worth
more than profit. Especially profit on blood”).
96 See infra, Section IV.D.
97 Andrew Hill, Companies’ Flight From Moscow Sets Some Hard Precedents, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar.
14, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/8d946204-6c74-4bfb-a649-c0335557b4ed.
98 See
Nestle
(@nestle),
TWITTER
(Mar.
2,
2022,
6:01
AM),
https://twitter.com/Nestle/status/1498976828530253829 (stating “At Nestlé, we are prioritizing safety and
support for our employees in the region”).
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3. Yale School of Management (SOM) List
Public pressure on corporations has been amplified by the publication of a
list tracking corporate responses to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by
Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and the Yale School of Management (SOM). 99
The list was first published in the week of February 28, when only several
dozen companies had announced their departure from Russia. It initially focused
on large US companies with substantial exposure to Russia, but then expanded
over time to include firms from across the world, as well as public and private
companies of varying size and varying presence in Russia.100
They now cover more than 1,200 public and private companies from across
the globe, and they place firms in one of five categories based on their level of
withdrawal from Russia.101 This starts with an A rating for those that made a
clean break or permanently exited Russia, and it ends with an F grade for those
that are “digging in” and refusing to reduce their activities in the country.102
The goal of the list was to push every corporation to publicly commit to
leaving Russia, encouraging boycotts of companies that defy pressure to do
so.103 They were able to garner significant attention with widespread media
coverage and circulation.104

99 Over 1,000 Companies Have Curtailed Operations in Russia—But Some Remain,
Chief Executive Leadership Institute, YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT (Oct. 19, 2022),
https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/almost-1000-companies-have-curtailed-operations-russia-some-remain.
100 Sonnenfeld, et al., supra note 9.
101 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld et al., Businesses That Refuse to Leave Russia Are Experiencing The Greatest Costs,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/26/businessesthat-left-russia-not-hurting-better-off/.
102 Id.
103 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Steven Tian, Some of the Biggest Brands Are Leaving Russia. Others Just Can’t
Quit
Putin.
Here’s
a
List,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/07/opinion/companies-ukraine-boycott.html.
104 Sonnenfeld et.al supra note 9 (“In the two months since, this list of companies staying/leaving Russia
has already garnered significant attention for its role in helping catalyze the mass corporate exodus from Russia,
with widespread media coverage and circulation across company boardrooms, policymaker circles, and other
communities of concerned citizens around the world.” The authors have also written short editorials for The
New York Times, The Washington Post, Fortune, amongst others; each of which were the most-read articles in
their respective outlets for at least 36 hours upon publication.); See also Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Steven Tian, A
Widely Shared List Of U.S. Companies Leaving And Staying In Russia Is Holding Business Leaders Accountable,
FORTUNE (Mar. 16, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/03/16/companies-leaving-russia-list-accountability/
(“[O]ur list provided a much cited “hall of shame” that guided the voices of employees, customers, and investors
seeking to show their disapproval. In fact, the first day our list appeared on CNBC, many of the companies we
identified as remaining in Russia saw their stocks drop 15% to 30%, on a day where the key market indexes fell
only two to three percent.”).
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4. Stock Prices
Scholars so far have focused on stock market reactions to companies’
decisions to leave or stay in Russia.
Research conducted by Professor Sonnenfeld and other members of the SOM
team shows that companies that curtailed operations in Russia have generally
outperformed companies that did not.105 The firms graded with an “F” according
to the Yale list, consistently underperformed all other categories to a statistically
significant degree. They add that for those companies that have withdrawn from
Russia, the wealth creation driven by gains to shareholder equity far outweigh
the costs of Russian asset write-downs.106
Another paper finds that firms which left Russia experienced large negative
returns before announcing their exit decisions, while the damage to stock returns
stopped immediately after the exit announcements. According to the authors,
their findings suggest that the decision to withdraw from Russia was mainly
driven by negative pressure from the public and shareholders to cease operations
in the country.107
However, the results are not unequivocal. In contrast with the Yale SOM
research, one paper found that companies deciding to leave Russia had
considerably lower returns than those that continued their operations or that had
not yet made a final decision. They also noticed that the negative market reaction
was more pronounced for European manufacturers that announced plans to leave
Russia and European service firms that decided to stay, suggesting that the
industry category played an important role.108 Some media outlets also reported
negative effects from exiting Russia.109 Finally, other articles underscore that
factors such as regulatory climate risks110 and geography111 mattered for the
stock market response to the onset of war in Ukraine.
105

Sonnenfeld, et. al., supra note 9._
Id.
107 See Balyuk & Fedyk, supra note 84.
108 See Berninger, Kiesel, & Kolaric, supra note 54.
109
See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham & Thomas Gryta, Companies Size Up Their Losses on Russian Operations,
WALL STREET JOURNAL: BUS. (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-size-up-their-losseson-russian-operations-11649928600.
110 Ming Deng, et. al., The Russia-Ukraine War and Climate Policy Expectations: Evidence from the Stock
Market, SWISS FINANCE INST.: RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 22-29 (July 12, 2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4080181. (Finding that firms with greater exposure to climate transition risk performed
better, particularly in the U.S., while companies for which a textual measure suggests strong exposure to inflation
risks performed worse.)
111 Jonathan Federle, André Meier, Gernot Müller, & Victor Sehn, Proximity to War: The Stock Market
Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH: DISCUSSION PAPER
106
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C. Corporate Reactions
The corporate response to the Russian assault was decisive and widespread,
but varied greatly in concrete measures taken, in timing, and in public statements
released.
1. Different Responses
Some companies promptly made a clean break from Russia, permanently
exiting the country and leaving behind essentially no operational footprint. BP,
for instance, quickly announced on February 27 its plan to completely exit
Russia.112 Others did not permanently exit or divest, but suspended all or almost
all Russian operations. In these cases, companies often ceased operating in
Russia while still paying their Russian employees, thereby keeping open the
option to return.113 Some companies suspended only a significant portion of their
business in Russia. An example is PepsiCo, which stated: “given the horrific
events occurring in Ukraine we are announcing the suspension of the sale of
Pepsi-Cola, and our global beverage brands in Russia, including 7Up and
Mirinda. We will also be suspending capital investments and all advertising and
promotional activities in Russia.”114 Other companies publicly announced a
pause in new investment or suspension of minor operations, but they continued
substantive business in Russia. Mondelez and Philip Morris fall into this
category.115 JPMorgan Chase & Co and Goldman Sachs Group Inc were the first
NO. DP17185 (Apr. 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121360. (Emphasizing that countries geographically close
to the war, on average, incurred an abnormal decline in equity indices, while countries farther away fared much
better in comparison.).
112 See
Press Release, BP, BP to Exit Rosneft Shareholding (Feb. 27, 2022)
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-to-exit-rosneftshareholding.html. Accord Press Release, Shell, Shell Intends to Exit Equity Partnerships Held with Gazprom
Entities, (Feb. 28, 2022) https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2022/shell-intends-to-exitequity-partnerships-held-with-gazprom-entities.html (statement of Shell CEO Ben van Beurden) (“Our decision
to exit is one we take with conviction… We cannot – and we will not – stand by.”).
113 See Georgi Kantchev, Adidas Closes Its Stores in Russia, WALL ST. J, (Mar. 8, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-08/card/adidas-closes-its-stores-inrussia-RdpeOsI4W0n7Q72skdQf (describing how it would suspend operations in Russia until further notice, but
continue to pay its employees there); Statement, Disney, Statement from the Walt Disney Company in Response
to the Ongoing Crisis in Ukraine, (Mar. 10, 2022), https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/statement-from-the-waltdisney-company-in-response-to-the-ongoing-crisis-in-ukraine/ (“Even as we pause these businesses, we remain
committed to our dedicated colleagues in Russia, who will remain employed.”).
114 See PepsiCo, PepsiCo Suspends Production and Sale of Pepsi-Cola and Other Global Beverage brands
in Russia, (Mar. 8, 2022) (quoting email from PepsiCo CEO Roman Laguarta) https://www.pepsico.com/ourstories/press-release/pepsico-suspends-production-and-sale-of-pepsi-cola-and-other-global-beverage-brandsin-russia.
115 See
Press
Release,
Mondelez,
Our
Statement
on
the
War
in
Ukraine
https://www.mondelezinternational.com/News/Statement-on-War-in-Ukraine: (quoting an internal memo from
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major US banks to announce their withdrawal from Russia. 116 Yet they
continued to trade company bonds tied to Russia until the OFAC – after being
pressed by US Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Katie Porter117 –
clarified that sanctions prohibit US market participants from purchasing new and
existing debt and equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian
Federation.118 Some of the companies that announced their intention to leave
Russia sold their Russian assets to a local buyer. For example, this decision was
taken by McDonald’s, Renault, Shell, and Société Générale.119 Finally, several
companies, such as Unicredit and Zimmer Biomet, did not announce any kind
of exit or reduction of either their operations or their investments in the country,
largely operating in the country as they did before.120
Mondelez CEO to employees) (“As a food company, we are scaling back all non-essential activities in Russia
while helping maintain continuity of the food supply during the challenging times ahead.”); Philip Morris
International, Phillip Morris International Inc. (PMI) Suspends Investment and Activates Plans to Scale Down
Manufacturing Operations in Russia, (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.pmi.com/media-center/press-releases/pressdetails?newsId=24966: (“Philip Morris International Inc. (NYSE: PM) today announces the suspension of its
planned investments in the Russian Federation, including all new product launches and commercial, innovation,
and manufacturing investments. PMI has also activated plans to scale down its manufacturing operations in
Russia amid ongoing supply chain disruptions and the evolving regulatory environment”).
116 See Matt Scuffham, et. al., Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan unwinding Russia businesses, REUTERS (Mar.
10, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/goldman-sachs-exit-russia-bloomberg-news-2022-03-10/.
117 Laura Benitez & Sridhar Natarajan, JPMorgan, Goldman Halt Russia Debt Trade as US Tightens Ban,
BLOOMBERG
(June
14,
2022),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/bankruptcylaw/XCLHAD6S000000?bna_news_filter=bankruptcy-law#jcite.
118 FAQ, US Department of the Treasury, Do the New Investment Prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.)
14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (Collectively, “the Respective E.O.s”) Prohibit U.S. Persons from Purchasing
Debt or Equity Securities Issued by an Entity in the Russian Federation, (Jun. 6, 2022),
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1054.
119 See Michael Dabaie, McDonald’s to Sell Russian Business to Licensee, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May
19, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mcdonalds-to-sell-russian-business-to-licensee-11652963542; Nick
Kostov, Renault Sells Russia Business to State-Backed Entity for One Ruble, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 16,
2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/renault-sells-russia-business-to-state-backed-entity-for-one-ruble11652692431?mod=article_inline; Jenny Strasburg, Shell to Sell Russian Retail Stations, Lubricant Business to
Lukoil, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 12, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-to-sell-russian-retailstations-lubricant-business-to-lukoil-11652354439?mod=article_inline; Patricia Kowsmann, Société Générale
Sells Russian Bank to Oligarch Vladimir Potanin, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 11, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/societe-generale-sells-russian-bank-to-oligarch-vladimir-potanin11649670434?mod=article_inline. ; See Jenny Strasburg, Shell to Sell Russian Retail Stations, Lubricant
Business to Lukoil, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 12, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-to-sell-russianretail-stations-lubricant-business-to-lukoil-11652354439?mod=article_inline; Patricia Kowsmann, Société
Générale Sells Russian Bank to Oligarch Vladimir Potanin, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 11, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/societe-generale-sells-russian-bank-to-oligarch-vladimir-potanin11649670434?mod=article_inline.
120 Press Release, UniCredit S.p.A., (Mar. 8, 2022) https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/en/press-media/pressreleases-price-sensitive/2022/u.html (“UniCredit has been present in Russia since 2005 and has experience in
adapting to, and fully complying with, sanctions. We are closely monitoring the developments in the country, in
full cooperation with regulators, and with dedicated cross expert teams which defined robust and tested
contingency plans to protect our people on the ground, our clients in all Europe and our shareholders.”);
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2. Different “Justifications”
Companies presented a range of different public statements explaining the
reasons behind their response.
The companies that left or suspended all operations in Russia usually
justified their decision on moral/ethical grounds, but they also added that it was
in the long-term interest of their shareholders. For instance, Bernard Looney,
BP’s CEO, about the decision to exit Russia declared: “I am convinced that the
decisions we as a Board have taken are not only the right things to do, they are
also in the long-term interests of bp and our shareholders.”121 Significantly, New
York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli sent letters to many big companies,
such as McDonald’s, PepsiCo, Mondelez, and Estee Lauder, urging them to
review their business in Russia. DiNapoli explained that suspending or ending
business in Russia not only “would address various investment risks associated
with the Russian market”, but it would also play a key role in “condemning
Russia’s role in fundamentally undermining the international order.”122
Yet, more surprisingly, the companies who decided to stay in Russia also
often mentioned the interests of stakeholders, such as Russian employees or the
Russian population.
Antoine de Saint-Affrique, chief executive of the food company Danone,
claimed a “responsibility” to keep doing business in Russia for “the tens of
thousands of people who depend on us.”123 Koch Industries Inc. defended its
decision to remain in Russia in order to protect the interests of its employees in
Russia.124 Uniqlo’s CEO indicated that while he is against the war, all Uniqlo
Statement,
Zimmer
Biomet,
Zimmer
Biomet
Statement
on
Ukraine
(Mar.
2022)
https://www.zimmerbiomet.com/en/zbstatement.html#:~:text=March%202022&text=The%20Zimmer%20Biomet%20Foundation%20is,them%20to
%20hospitals%20in%20Ukraine (“We continue to monitor the situation in Ukraine and Russia. We have
customers, distributors and team members or their loved ones in both countries, and our focus is on maintaining
contact with them and offering our support”).
121 Statement, BP, A Message to all BP Staff on our Relationship with Rosneft, (Feb. 27, 2022)
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/reimagining-energy/a-message-to-all-bp-staff-onour-relationship-with-rosneft.html.
122 Hilary Russ, ᴍᴄᴅᴏɴᴀʟᴅ’s, Pepsi, Others Should Consider Pausing Russia Operations -NY Pension Fund,
REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/mcdonalds-pepsi-others-shouldconsider-pausing-russia-operations-ny-pension-fund-2022-03-04/.
123 Leila Abboud, Danone Chief Defends Staying in Russia as He Sets Out Global Strategy, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/a812ec18-058c-49b2-8a70-e8791ea1e43a (“We have a
responsibility to the people we feed, the farmers who provide us with milk, and the tens of thousands of people
who depend on us”).
124 See Dave Robertson, Pres. & COO, Koch Industries, Statement from Dave Robertson: The Crisis in
Ukraine, KOCH NEWSROOM (Mar. 16, 2022), https://news.kochind.com/news/2022/statement-crisis-in-ukraine
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stores would continue to operate in Russia, because “clothing is a necessity of
life. The people of Russia have the same right to live as we do.”125 Only three
days later, after much criticism and a #boycottUNIQLO campaign, the company
reversed its decision and closed shops in Russia blaming “operational
challenges.”126
Within the companies that only partially suspended their operations in
Russia, some consumer-product firms vowed to stop selling all but essentials for
the Russian population. Yet they drew criticism for what they counted as
“essential.” For instance, PepsiCo CEO Ramon Laguarta stated: “As a food and
beverage company, now more than ever we must stay true to the humanitarian
aspect of our business. That means we have a responsibility to continue to offer
our other products in Russia, including daily essentials such as milk and other
dairy offerings, baby formula and baby food.”127 The company, though, also
kept selling potato chips. Similarly, Unilever pledged to continue to supply only
“everyday essential food and hygiene products”,128 yet the products sold by
Unilever included ice-cream brands such as Inmarko; cosmetics brand Black
Pearl; cleansing brand Pure Line; hand-cream brand Silky Hands; and children’s
cosmetics brand Little Fairy.129
Some of the companies that sold their local assets to a Russian buyer did not
disclose the financial terms of the deal, but they remarked how the agreements
were expected to preserve their employees’ jobs in Russia.130
(“While Guardian’s business in Russia is a very small part of Koch, we will not walk away from our employees
there or hand over these manufacturing facilities to the Russian government so it can operate and benefit from
them (which is what The Wall Street Journal has reported they would do). Doing so would only put our
employees there at greater risk and do more harm than good”).
125 Kanoko Matsuyama, ‘Clothing Is a Necessity of Life’: Uniqlo Owner Defends Choice to Stay in Russia
as Other Retailers Flee, FORTUNE (Mar. 7, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/03/07/uniqlo-owner-fast-retailingdefends-choice-stay-russia-retailers-flee-ukraine-invasion/.
126 Kanoko Matsuyama, Uniqlo Shutters Shops in Russia Days After CEO Said Chain Would Stay Because
‘Clothing Is a Necessity of Life’, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/03/10/uniqlo-fastretailing-shutters-shops-russia-ceo-said-chain-would-stay-open/.
127 See Ramon Laguarta, CEO, PepsiCo, PepsiCo. Suspends production & sale of Pepsi in Russia.
Continues to provide essential foods., PEPSICO, https://contact.pepsico.com/pepsico/article/pepsico-suspendsproduction-sale-of-pepsi-in-russia-continues-to.
128 See Statement, Alan Jope, CEO, Unilever, Updated Unilever Statement on The War in Ukraine,
UNILEVER (July 3, 2022), https://www.unilever.com/news/news-search/2022/updated-unilever-statement-onthe-war-in-ukraine/.
129 Saabira Chaudhuri & Sharon Terlep, Lip Gloss, Potato Chips, Air Fresheners Are Among the
‘Essentials’ Still Sold in Russia, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/forcompanies-still-selling-in-russia-essential-is-a-loose-term-11647946800.
130 See Nick Kostov, Renault Sells Russia Business to State-Backed Entity for One Ruble, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (May 16, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/renault-sells-russia-business-to-state-backed-entityfor-one-ruble-11652692431?mod=article_inline. (For instance, Renault’s CEO Luca de Meo said: “Today, we
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The corporate choice to continue to operate in Russia claiming the need to
help Russian employees or to supply essential goods to the Russian population
has been labeled as window-washing in order to mitigate reputational losses.131
Another critique is that sanctions are a form of economic warfare used to oppose
military warfare, so they are designed to have a profound, deleterious effect on
the economy and welfare of Russia.132 Therefore, companies that keep on doing
business in Russia contribute tax dollars to the Russian government, and support
value chains linked to the Russian military, undermining the premises of
sanctions inflicted on the regime. For example, US Senator Elizabeth Warren
explicitly said that JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs continuing to purchase
company bonds tied to Russia meant “capitalizing on Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine and undermining sanctions placed on Russian businesses.”133
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This Part describes the findings of our empirical analysis of companies’
response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, using a sample of companies
included in the S&P 500 and STOXX Europe 600 (also called STOXX 600)
indices.
Below we first present sample descriptive statistics (Section IV.A). Next, we
discuss the boycott campaigns on Twitter against companies refusing to
withdraw from Russia (Section IV.B). Then we report our findings with respect
to the relationship between company revenue exposure to Russia and the speed
of the announcement to withdraw or suspend Russian operations (Section IV.C).
Finally, we present our findings regarding the association between the Twitterbased measures of boycott campaign virality and companies’ decision to leave
Russia (Section IV.D).

have taken a difficult but necessary decision; and we are making a responsible choice towards our 45,000
employees in Russia.”).
131 Saabira Chaudhuri & Sharon Terlep, Lip Gloss, Potato Chips, Air Fresheners Are Among the
‘Essentials’ Still Sold in Russia, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/forcompanies-still-selling-in-russia-essential-is-a-loose-term-11647946800.
132 See Paolo Pasquariello, Russia-Ukraine war: What To Know About Sanctions—Their Effects and
Effectiveness, University of Michigan News, (May 3, 2022), https://news.umich.edu/russia-ukraine-war-whatto-know-about-sanctions-their-effects-and-effectiveness/.
133 Hannah Levitt, Elizabeth Warren Says Wall Street ‘Undermining’ Russia Sanctions, ʙʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ (Mar.
4, 2022), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/R892GCT0AFB4.
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A. Sample Descriptive Statistics
To investigate companies’ responses to the Russian invasion, we collected
data on companies included in the S&P 500 and STOXX 600 indices, which are
the most popular indices with a large number of mega, large and midcapitalization companies in the USA and Europe, respectively.134 Our initial
sample consists of 1,090 companies—500 from the S&P 500 and 590 from
STOXX 600 (excluding secondary listings)—extracted from the FactSet
database on April 4, 2022.
We use FactSet’s Geographic Revenue Exposure (GeoRev) as a proxy for
companies’ exposure to Russia. More specifically, we extract the variable
GeoRev Country Pct – Russian Federation (further, GeoRev%-Russia), which
captures the percentage of revenue exposure to Russia.135 Although a company’s
complete exposure to Russia can include assets, suppliers, employees and other
factors, we do not have a reliable broader measure for a large sample of
companies.136 The sample of companies with available GeoRev%-Russia data
consists of 718 companies (66% of the initial sample). Although many of the
companies with missing data most likely do not have any sales exposure to
Russia (e.g., utility companies in the USA), we do not want to make a judgment
call about all the companies; hence, we do not replace the missing data with
zeros. The companies with available GeoRev%-Russia data are larger in size:
the average market capitalization of our sample companies is $57 billion
compared to $49 billion for companies with missing GeoRev data. And a higher

134 Id. (Mega-cap companies are those with a market capitalization of $200 billon or higher, large-cap
companies - from $10 billion and $200 billion, and mid-cap companies – from $2 billion to $10 billion. As of
February 23, 2022, there were no small-cap companies (with a market cap between $300 million and $2 billion)
in S&P 500 and STOXX 600.).
135 See
GeoRevenue
Portfolio
Exposure,
FIDELITY
INSTITUTIONAL
(Jun.
2022).
https://institutional.fidelity.com/app/proxy/content?literatureURL=/9886336.PDF. (According to FactSet,
“conventional geographic revenue data are difficult to interpret and compare between companies because they
are not normalized. Furthermore, these non-normalized geographic revenue data do not provide any exposure
estimates on countries and regions that are not explicitly disclosed by the companies. GeoRev answers these two
challenges by first mapping companies’ revenues to a normalized geographic taxonomy, and then applying a
proprietary algorithm to estimate % revenue exposure to countries and regions that are not explicitly disclosed.
Estimates are accompanied by a Confidence Factor, which offers an easy way to distinguish them from actual
disclosed values as well as ranks their trustworthiness.” The FactSet’s GeoRev Confidence Factor ranges from
the lowest 0.5 to the highest 1.0. “A confidence factor of 1.000 indicates that the revenue is an actual, reported,
or declared value.” All GeoRev-Russia variables in our sample have the confidence factor of 1, i.e. they are the
actual, reported, or declared values.).
136 See, e.g., Daniyal Ahmed, et. al., supra note 52. (An alternative method of estimating a company’s
exposure to Russia is to search for Russia-related keywords in company filings and earnings calls. Such an
approach would ‘hit’ a larger number of companies but fail to generate a comparable numerical value.).
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proportion of companies with missing data are in the Real Estate, Utilities, and
Financial sectors.
Economic sanctions against Russia (discussed in Section III.A) affected all
Western companies with operations in Russia, but some industries − for
example, airlines − were more affected than others. For this reason, any analysis
of company responses to the Russian invasion should control for industryspecific effects. We use the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) for
our empirical analysis.137 GICS is an industry taxonomy developed by MSCI
and S&P and used by the global financial community. We use GICS sector-level
classification for all eleven sectors, except Industrials (Code 20), which is
further split into three sub-groups (Industry group level)—Capital Goods,
Commercial & Professional Services, and Transportation—due to a higher
number of companies and over-diverse sub-categories.
Table 1 reports the number of sample companies by industry and index. The
largest number of companies are within the Capital Goods industry group, which
includes, for example, the following industries (at the GICS 6-digit level):
Aerospace & Defense, Building Products, and Construction & Engineering.
Another two highly populated industry sectors are Health Care and Information
Technology.

137 See
The Global
solutions/indexes/gics.

Industry

Classification

Standard,

ᴍsᴄɪ,

https://www.msci.com/our-
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Table 1: Number of Sample Companies by Industry and Index
Industry name
Capital Goods
Commercial & Professional
Services
Transportation
Energy
Materials
Consumer Cyclical
Consumer Staples
Health Care
Financials
Information Technology
Communication Services
Utilities
Real Estate
Total

Industry code

S&P500

STOXX600

Total

GICS Group 2010

43

78

121

2020
2030
GICS Sector 10
15
25
30

6
7
7
25
31
23

17
12
10
44
41
35

23
19
17
69
72
58

35
40
45
50
55
60

50
29
68
18
0
5

48
43
30
26
15
7

98
72
98
44
15
12

312

406

718

Next, we split the sample by company size and estimate the revenue
exposure to Russia in each size category. Table 2 shows that the average
GeoRev%-Russia is significantly higher among smaller firms. The difference
between Large and Mid-cap firms, as well as between Mega & Large vs. Midcap firms is statistically significant. It is important to note that company size is
based on the market capitalization of sample firms as of February 23, 2022, i.e.
a day before the Russian invasion. The results are similar if we use the market
capitalization data from earlier dates, such as February 17 (a week before) or
January 24 (a month before).
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Table 2: Revenue Exposure to Russia138

Average
GeoRev%-Russia
1.28

Number
of firms
35

Large

1.47

510

Mid

1.87

173

Total

1.56

718

Company size
Mega

Difference
Large vs.
Mid
(p-value)

Difference
Mega & Large
vs. Mid (pvalue)

0.009***

0.006***

B. Boycott Campaigns on Twitter
In addition to the need to adapt to economic sanctions against Russia,
companies with Russian operations almost instantly felt public pressure from
consumers, employees, and activists to leave Russia. As discussed in Section
III.B.2, people worldwide started boycott campaigns via Twitter, targeting
multinational companies that stayed in Russia. To estimate the power or virality
of these campaigns and evaluate their potential impact on companies’ actions,
we collected tweets related to boycott campaigns against our sample companies.
First, we searched for the company Twitter handles and manually checked
that those are the official company accounts. For example, The Coca-Cola
Company uses the handle @CocaColaCo, which was created in March 2009,
and which has 1.1 million followers, and had posted 22.5 thousand tweets
(including retweets) by July 2022. After excluding 52 companies without
handles and Twitter Inc. itself, our final sample consists of 665 companies. The
largest company without an official company Twitter account is Berkshire
Hathaway. Although Warren Buffett, the chairman and CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway, has an account (@WarrenBuffett) created on April 2013 with 1.7
million followers, by July 2022 he had posted only ten tweets, the latest being
from April 2016.
Next, we collected all tweets (including retweets) related to boycott
campaigns during the 60-day period after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To
retrieve all the relevant tweets, we employed the Twitter Academic Research

138 The table reports average revenue exposure (in %) to Russia by company size category. All variables
are defined in Table 4. The last two columns report the p-values of a two-sided mean difference test.
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application programming interface (API) v2.139 Using Twarc2 for Python,140 we
ran a query that included (a company handle) AND (Russia or Ukraine) AND
(boycott) to extract tweets referring to a boycott campaign against a company in
our sample. This process resulted in 20,316 valid tweets (including retweets)
from February 24 to April 24. Figure 1 shows the number of daily tweets and
adds a timeline with some important announcements or events. The median daily
number of boycott tweets during the 60-day period is 147 and the first day with
the above median number of tweets is March 1 when the first version of the Yale
SOM list (described in Section III.B.3 and in the following Section) was
published.
Figure 1: Number of Boycott Tweets by Day141

C. Speed of Announcement
As discussed in Section III.B.3, the Yale SOM list contributed to public
pressure and reinforced the boycott campaigns against companies that did not
leave Russia. Although the Yale SOM list classification includes five categories
(from A to F), only Grades A (Withdrawal) and B (Suspension) can be

139

See Developer Platform, Manage Tweets, TWITTER, https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/twitterapi/tweets/manage-tweets/introduction.
140 See twarc2, ᴛᴡᴀʀᴄ, https://twarc-project.readthedocs.io/en/latest/twarc2_en_us/.
141 This Figure reports the daily number of tweets (including retweets) that include a sample company
handle AND the words Russia OR Ukraine AND the word boycott. Grey bars represent days with some
important announcements or events.
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convincingly associated with the concept of leaving Russia.142 Grade C (Scaling
Back) marks some action, but continuing operations, while Grades D (Buying
Time) and Grade F (Digging In) are no-action categories. Companies made the
announcements related to their Russian operations at different times, so our first
empirical question concerns the relationship between the speed of the
announcement and actual exposure to Russia.
The announcement dates were extracted from a designated project page at
the Yale School of Management.143 The list is continuously updated by Professor
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and a Yale Research Team of 28 researchers. We use the list
available as of July 1, 2022. Figure 2 reports the number of our 718 sample firms
(with GeoRev data described in Section IV.A) that made an announcement in
the 60-day period after the start of the war. Altogether 216 firms (30% of the
total) made some statements about their operations in Russia, while 144 of them
(2/3 of all announcement firms) can be classified as leaving Russia (Grades A
and B). The peak of announcement activity was between March 2 and March
13, with a median announcement speed of 14 and 12 days after the start of the
war for all announcement-issuing firms and leaving Russia firms, respectively.
Figure 2: Number of Firms Making Announcements (Yale SOM List)144

Number of firms

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Feb 24 Mar 2- Mar 8- Mar Mar Mar Apr 1- Apr 7- Apr Apr
- Mar 1 7
13 14-19 20-25 26-31
6
12 13-18 19-24

142

See Sonnenfeld et. al., supra note 9, at 1.
See Yale CELI List of Companies Leaving and Staying in Russia, YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT (Sept.
22, 2022).
144 This figure reports the number of firms making announcements related to their operations in Russia
(according to the Yale SOM list) during a 60-day period after the start of the war (February 24 - April 24). The
time period is split into 10 equal (6-day long) bins. The total number of sample firms (with GeoRev data
described in Section IV.A) that made an announcement during this time period is 216, including 144 firms with
the strongest leaving Russia actions (Grade A or B). Black bars represent all announcing firms, while grey bars
represent leaving Russia (Grades A and B) firms.
143
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Table 3 below lists sample companies with the largest revenue exposure to
Russia. Mondi plc, a multinational packaging and paper company, has the largest
exposure with GeoRev%-Rus of 16.7% and it was assigned Grade F rating as of
March 10 when it issued a press release stating: “Syktyvkar [a paper mill located
in the Komi Republic] is currently operating, but the mill is starting to see a
number of operational constraints,” and further explaining that “Recognising its
corporate values and broader stakeholder responsibilities, the Board is assessing
all options for the Group’s interests in Russia, including any form of legal
separation.”145 Although on May 4 Mondi announced that “the board has
decided to divest the group’s Russian assets”146 and was upgraded to Grade A
in the Yale SOM list, we keep the grade category assigned during our sample
period that ends on April 24. The same approach is used for other companies,
e.g. Renault, which was upgraded outside the sample period.

145 See MONDI PLC: Update on Russian Business Activities, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2022, 10:59 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2022-03-10/mondi-plc-update-on-russian-business-activities.
146 See UK Packaging Firm Mondi to Sell Russian Assets, REUTERS (May 4, 2022, 1:36 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/uk-packaging-firm-mondi-sell-russian-assets-2022-05-04/.
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Table 3: Top-15 Companies by Revenue Exposure to Russia147
GeoRe
v%Rus

Size

Index

Grade

Announcement
date

Mondi plc
Raiffeisen Bank
International AG
Rockwool
International A/S
Class B

16.7

Large

STOXX600

F

10-Mar

16.4

Mid

STOXX600

F

17-Mar

15.2

Mid

STOXX600

D

04-Mar

Inchcape plc

11.2

Mid

STOXX600

-

-

Carlsberg AS Class B

9.8

Large

STOXX600

A

28-Mar

Renault SA

9.0

Large

STOXX600

B

23-Mar

UniCredit S.p.A.
Philip Morris
International Inc.

7.7

Large

STOXX600

F

15-Mar

7.3

Large

S&P500

C

24-Mar

easyJet plc

6.7

Mid

STOXX600

-

-

Epiroc AB Class A

6.1

Large

STOXX600

B

24-Mar

Danone SA
Henkel AG & Co.
KGaA Pref

6.0

Large

STOXX600

D

06-Mar

5.8

Large

STOXX600

A

19-Apr

Allianz SE

5.4

Large

STOXX600

C

25-Feb

Neste Corporation
Eurofins Scientific
Société Européenne

5.2

Large

STOXX600

B

01-Mar

5.1

Large

STOXX600

-

-

Company

In this Section, we are particularly interested in the revenue exposure to
Russia of the early movers (or early announcers), i.e. the firms that announced
they were leaving Russia even before the boycott campaign spiked and the first
version of the Yale SOM list was published. We define as early movers twentyseven companies that announced they were leaving Russia (Grade A or B) on or
before March 1 (the first bin in Figure 2) and compare their GeoRev%-Russia
with all other companies in the GeoRev sample of 718 companies.
Unsurprisingly, only one company (Neste) out of the top 15 companies by their
exposure to Russia (listed in Table 3) appears among the early movers. Figure 3
presents the difference in revenue exposure to Russia of early movers (1.29) and
all other companies (1.57). Although the difference is statistically insignificant
147 Grade is from the Yale SOM list as of April 24 and includes five categories of company actions with
respect to their Russian operations: A (Withdrawal), B (Suspension), C (Scaling Back), D (Buying Time) and F
(Digging In). Companies highlighted in grey are classified as leaving Russia (Grades A and B).
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due to the small sample size of early movers, the average exposure to Russia of
early movers is smaller than the lower bound of the non-early movers’ 95
percent confidence interval. This result is confined to US companies (S&P 500):
the average exposure to Russia of US early movers (0.89) is smaller than that of
non-early movers (1.12) and even smaller than the lower bound of the 95 percent
confidence interval of non-early movers.
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Figure 3: Exposure to Russia for Early Movers148
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1.90
1.72
1.57
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1.12

1.00

0.89

0.80
0.60
0.40

0.20
ALL Early
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(N=27)
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(N=691)

S&P500
Early Movers
(N=14)

S&P500
Others
(N=298)

STOXX600 STOXX600
Early Movers
Others
(N=13)
(N=393)

Our analysis confirms the intuition that only corporations with very limited
financial exposure to Russia could quickly take a bold stance and announce their
withdrawal from Russian operations. These actions, which in certain cases could
be classified as woke-washing, put pressure on other market players with larger

148 This figure shows the average values and 95 percent confidence intervals of revenue exposure to Russia
(GeoRev%-Russia) for early movers—the firms that announced they were leaving Russia (Yale SOM list Grade
A or B) on or before March 1, 2022—and other companies. The first two bars show the results for the full
GeoRev Sample (718), while the remaining bars show the respective results split by S&P 500 and STOXX 600
companies.
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exposure and higher shareholder value at stake. The more exposed companies
were forced to make an announcement perhaps earlier than they would have
wished, given the complexity of the situation.
D. Boycott Campaign Virality and Withdrawal from Russia
In this Section, we turn to analysis of the boycott campaigns on Twitter and
attempt to measure their “virality” and relationship to the decision to withdraw
from Russia. Viral marketing is a concept developed in the late 1990s and refers
to a marketing technique where users help spread the advertiser’s message to
other users.149 More recently, virality as a concept is applied to the spread of
information among social media users.150 We focus on Twitter, instead of other
social media platforms such as Facebook or Instagram, due to Twitter’s
popularity in the corporate sector, as well as access to extensive historical data
through the Twitter API for Academic Research.151
As described in Section IV.B, we use the sample with official Twitter
accounts, which we call the Twitter Sample, that includes 665 companies. We
design two firm-specific measures of boycott campaign virality prior to
company announcements about leaving Russia. The first measure is a
combination of the number of tweets (including retweets) 152 (#tweets) and the
number of followers for users that tweeted (#followers), i.e. the potential number
of users who view the tweets.153 For each day and sample company, we collect
the total number of tweets and retweets that include the company’s Twitter
handle (e.g. @CocaColaCo) AND the words Russia OR Ukraine AND the word

149 See, e.g., Estela Viñarás, What Is Viral Marketing? Examples and Advantages, CYBERCLICK BLOG
(Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.cyberclick.net/numericalblogen/what-is-viral-marketing-advantages-andexamples.
150 See Brett Campbell et. al., Earnings Virality, J. OF ACCT. & ECON. (JAE), Vol. 74, No. 1 (2022), at 7
(“Social media platforms are particularly well suited to facilitate rapid diffusion because they tether users
together into networks, which enables information to spread almost instantaneously from user to user, both
within and across user networks. This spread of information is characterized by an element of speed, which
social media facilitates by pushing information to users’ feeds . . . virality results in content being consumed by
a large and broad audience.”).
151 Id. at 14: (“specific features on Twitter . . . are highly amenable to virality . . . allows us to measure
extreme information dissemination . . . is frequently either the source of virality or plays a role in a piece of
information going viral . . . often assists information posted on other social media platforms … is an important
venue for social investing.”).
152 Id. at 15 (“the concept of retweeting, or resharing in general, is part of what fuels the speed and depth of
dissemination on social media.”).
153 Id. (The authors use the labels #tweet and #feeds, respectively, for their measure of earnings virality.).

2022]

CORPORATE RESPONSE TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

43

boycott (with or without a hashtag).154 Likewise, we collect the total number of
followers for users that tweeted the above mentioned keywords.
Arguably, a company’s announcement about leaving Russia could go viral
after the announcement, and the query would pick up a (made up) tweet like
“Today @CompanyA suspended its operations in Russia. Well done! #Boycott
companies that are still financing Putin’s war: @CompanyB, @CompanyC, . . .
!” To avoid capturing social media activity after the announcement, we design a
firm-specific measure that estimates the virality of a boycott campaign prior to
the announcement. This measure is based on the cumulative number of tweets
per company (i) from the first day of the war (February 24) up to one day before
the announcement (#cumtweetsi,t-1), i.e. for a company (i) that announced its
intention to leave Russia on March 5 (t), we sum up all boycott campaign-related
tweets (that include the company’s i handle) from February 24 to March 4
(#cumtweetsi,Mar4). Similarly, we calculate the cumulative number of followers
for users that tweeted about the boycott campaign (#cumfollowersi,t-1).
We assign an implied Grade F rating to Twitter Sample companies that had
not made any announcement by April 24, 2022, and create an additional
Modified Twitter Sample that excludes companies that did not make any
announcement about their Russian operations and that had revenue exposure to
Russia below 0.2%. The Modified Twitter Sample contains 620 (out of 665)
companies and assures that we are not assigning an implied Grade F rating to
companies that have no or minimal Russian operations. Note that some
companies that did announce their withdrawal from Russia had 0.2% or lower
GeoRev%-Russia values. For companies with an implied Grade F rating, we
calculate the boycott campaign virality as of April 24 using #cumtweetsi,Apr24 and
#cumfollowersi,Apr24 that measure a firm-specific boycott campaign virality prior
to the announcement, in this case, after April 24 (if ever).
Next, we set a Virality Dummyi equal to one for companies that are in the
top decile of both variables before the announcement (#cumtweetsi,t-1 and
#cumfollowersi,t-1), and equal to zero otherwise.155 The second measure of
boycott campaign virality, LnTweetsi, is a continuous variable calculated as the
154 See,
e.g., Patrick Curl, (@patrickcurl), TWITTER (Mar. 5, 2022, 2:27 PM),
https://twitter.com/patrickcurl/status/1500191234756775936 (We manually check several randomly selected
tweets to ensure that the message is indeed about boycotting companies due to their refusal (or inaction) to leave
Russia.) (“@3M is still in Russia, huge company. impossible to boycott. . . they make ingredients in many things
we don’t realize. but we can still give them hell. . . anyone want to start convoys outside 3m factories across
America? #UkraineRussianWar.” 3M announced its suspension of operations in Russia on March 10 (Grade
B).).
155 See Campbell et al., supra note 147 (using a a similar approach for their Viral Earnings variable.).
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natural logarithm of one plus #cumtweetsi,t-1.156 For example, Puma SE (Grade
B) and Moody’s Corp (Grade A) both made leaving Russia announcements on
March 5, while Tesla Inc. has not made an announcement and, as of July 2022,
is not included in the Yale SOM list. Viral Dummy is 1 for Puma and 0 for
Moody’s and Tesla.157 LnTweets variable is 1.386 for Puma, 0 for Moody’s, and
2.944 for Tesla.158 All variables that we use for our empirical analysis are
summarized in Table 4.

156 Id. (We report the results using LnTweets, but we have also calculated a similar continuous variable
based on the cumulative number of followers, i.e. LnFollowers that is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus
#cumfollowersi,t-1. The LnFollowers is highly correlated with LnTweets and all the results are largely identical if
we use this variable in our analysis.).
157 Id. (Puma had in total 3 tweets (#cumtweets
Puma,Mar4) and 494 tweet followers (#cumfollowersPuma,Mar4)
prior to the announcement, which are both in the top decile of 665 Twitter Sample companies. Moody’s had zero
boycott campaign tweets and followers before the announcement, while Tesla had 18 boycott tweets
(#cumtweetsTesla,Apr24) and 6824 boycott campaign followers (#cumfollowersTesla,Apr24) that did not make it to the
top decile of all sample companies during the sample period.).
158 Id. (Puma had 3 tweets, so Ln(1+3)=1.386; Moody’s had 0 tweets, Ln(1+0)=0; and Tesla had 18 tweets,
Ln(1+18) =2.944.).
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Table 4: Variable Definitions
Variable Name
CumFollowersi,t-1
CumTweetsi,t-1

GeoRev%-Russia

Industry

Leaving Russia
Dummy
LnTweets
Size
Size Category

Variable Definition
Calculated similarly as CumTweetsi,t-1, using the
cumulative number of followers for users that tweeted
about the boycott campaign.
Calculated as the cumulative number of tweets per
company (i)—that include company i’s Twitter handle
AND the words Russia OR Ukraine AND the word
boycott (with or without a hashtag)—from the first day
of the war (February 24) up to one day before the
announcement (t). For companies without any
announcement as of April 24, the variable is measured
on April 24.
A firm-specific variable measuring the percentage of
revenue exposure to Russia. Source: FactSet’s
Geographic Revenue Exposure (GeoRev), the variable
GeoRev Country Pct – Russian Federation (extracted
on April 4).
Thirteen industry groups, using Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS). The two-digit sector
level classification is used for all (eleven) sectors
except Industrials (Code 20) which is further split into
three industry group categories (Codes 2010, 2020,
2030) due to a higher number of companies and overdiverse sub-categories.
Equals one for companies with Grade A and B in the
Yale SOM List, and zero otherwise.
A continuous variable calculated as the natural
logarithm of one plus CumTweetsi,t-1.
Natural logarithm of market capitalization (in millions
USD) as of February 23 (before the start of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine).
Mega-cap includes companies with a market
capitalization above $200 billion, Large-cap –
between $10 billion and $200 billion, and Mid-cap –
between $2 billion and $10 billion.
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Equals one for companies included in the S&P 500
Index, and zero otherwise.
A firm-specific boycott campaign virality measure
that equals one for companies that are in the top decile
of both— CumTweetsi,t-1 and CumFollowersi,t-1—
prior to making a statement about their Russian
operations.
A list of companies leaving and staying in Russia,
continuously updated by Professor Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld and a Yale Research Team of 28
researchers at the Yale School of Management (SOM)
Chief Executive Leadership Institute (CELI). The list
classifies companies into five categories/grades: A
(Withdrawal), B (Suspension), C (Scaling Back), D
(Buying Time), and F (Digging In).

Next, Table 5 reports the average values of Virality Dummy and LnTweets
by size category. Not surprisingly, boycott campaign virality is substantially
higher among larger companies. More than half (0.529) of mega-cap companies
were experiencing a viral boycott campaign before making a statement about
their Russian operations. The same proportion is about five times smaller for
large-cap (0.114) and twenty times smaller for mid-cap companies (0.027).
Table 5: Boycott Campaign Virality Measures by Size159
Virality
Dummy

LnTweets

Mega

0.529

2.339

34

Large
Mid

0.114
0.027

0.614
0.160

482
149

Total

0.116

0.600

665

Company size

Number of
companies

Finally, to examine the association between boycott campaign virality and
companies’ decision to withdraw from Russia, we use a cross-sectional ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression model in which the dependent variable is Leaving
Russia Dummy that equals one for companies leaving Russia (Grade A and B),
159 Virality Dummy and LnTweets are firm-specific boycott campaign virality measures calculated prior to
the company’s announcement about leaving or staying in Russia. Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.
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and zero otherwise.160 As explanatory variables, we include our two firmspecific boycott campaign virality measures (Virality Dummy and LnTweets),
one by one, and a set of control variables that may be associated with the
decision to leave Russia. In particular, we control for companies’ revenue
exposure to Russia, firm size, region (S&P 500 or STOXX Europe 600 index),
and industry effects. As discussed in Section IV.A, we use thirteen GICS
industry classification groups, with Energy being the base category in the
regressions. Arguably, sanctions imposed against Russia was a strong factor
influencing Western companies’ actions, and we attempt to control for this factor
by adding industry fixed effects, as sanctions typically had a similar effect on
companies within the same industry.
We present the model estimation results in Table 6. The results provide
strong evidence that firm-specific boycott campaign virality is positively related
to the leaving Russia decision, after controlling for firm size, industry, region,
and revenue exposure to Russia. We test for multicollinearity using the variance
inflation factor (VIF) and do not find any excessive correlation between
regression variables. In columns (1) and (2) we report the results using the
Twitter Sample (665 firms) and in columns (3) and (4)—using the Modified
Twitter Sample (620 firms) that excludes companies that did not make a
statement about their Russian operations and had revenue exposure to Russia
below 0.2%. The coefficients on our key variables of interest—Virality Dummy
and LnTweets—are both positive and significant at the one percent level. We
also find a positive and significant association between firm size and the leaving
Russia decision, which suggests that larger companies faced stronger pressure
to take a stance, irrespective of their exposure to Russia (the coefficient on
GeoRev%-Russia variable is close to zero and insignificant). Only one industry
sector (Transportation) exhibits a strong positive association with the leaving
Russia decision, which is not surprising given the fact that Airlines (a subcategory under Transportation) were among the most affected by sanctions.

160 Id. (The results are qualitatively similar if we use a prohibit model or if we use a dependent variable that
equals one for companies with Grade A, B, and C ratings. For brevity, we do not report these regressions, but
they are available upon request.).
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Table 6: Boycott Campaign Virality and Leaving Russia Decision161

VARIABLES
Virality Dummy

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.336***

0.328***

(5.383)

(5.235)

LnTweets

0.045***
(2.864)

(4)

0.042***
(2.645)

GeoRev%-Russia

0.001
(0.143)

0.004
(0.423)

-0.005
(-0.577)

-0.002
(-0.236)

Size

0.033**

0.044***

0.031**

0.042***

SP500 dummy

(2.364)
-0.022
(-0.651)

(2.881)
-0.019
(-0.544)

(2.052)
-0.028
(-0.789)

(2.613)
-0.025
(-0.681)

0.036

0.001

0.019

-0.019

Capital Goods

(0.324)
-0.010

(0.009)
-0.034

(0.153)
-0.031

(-0.149)
-0.058

Comm&Prof Services

(-0.093)
-0.098

(-0.310)
-0.120

(-0.263)
-0.129

(-0.476)
-0.154

Transportation

(-0.874)
0.442***

(-1.036)
0.410***

(-1.021)
0.417***

(-1.189)
0.382**

(2.930)

(2.627)

(2.615)

(2.319)

0.182
(1.611)
-0.029
(-0.248)

0.204*
(1.720)
-0.031
(-0.253)

0.171
(1.364)
-0.039
(-0.298)

0.191
(1.456)
-0.040
(-0.299)

-0.155
(-1.549)

-0.191*
(-1.829)

-0.180
(-1.578)

-0.219*
(-1.855)

Industry dummies:
Materials

Consumer Cyclical
Consumer Staples
Health Care

161

This table reports the results of a cross-sectional OLS regression. The dependent variable is Leaving
Russia Dummy which equals one for companies leaving Russia (Grade A and B), and zero otherwise. Virality
Dummy and LnTweets are firm-specific boycott campaign virality measures calculated prior to the company’s
announcement about leaving or staying in Russia. Variable definitions are provided in Table 4. T-statistics are
based on robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Information Technology
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Utilities
Real Estate
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
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0.021
(0.193)
0.075
(0.692)
0.120
(1.022)
-0.107
(-0.840)
-0.004
(-0.022)

-0.009
(-0.081)
0.055
(0.485)
0.108
(0.876)
-0.140
(-1.071)
-0.034
(-0.203)

0.019
(0.153)
0.062
(0.511)
0.142
(1.059)
-0.113
(-0.685)
0.018
(0.084)

-0.016
(-0.121)
0.039
(0.307)
0.127
(0.907)
-0.154
(-0.915)
-0.021
(-0.098)

-0.177
(-1.092)

-0.261
(-1.488)

-0.110
(-0.612)

-0.198
(-1.027)

665

665

620

620

0.172

0.134

0.169

0.131

Our analysis supports the hypothesis that stakeholder pressure via social
media campaigns can effectively signal people’s social preferences and affect
managerial decision making through their potential harm to corporate
reputation. It is not new that academic work can guide policy making and public
opinion on what companies should or should not do. However, in this case the
virality of the Yale SOM list and the speed at which it fueled the boycott
campaigns against large companies refusing to withdraw from Russia is
unparalleled. Our results offer reassurance that stakeholder pressure can be an
effective instrument promoting more socially responsible management.
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis has three important implications for the current debate on
stakeholder governance.
A. Risks of “Woke-Washing”
In Section IV.C we investigate the relationship between company revenue
exposure to Russia and the speed of the announcement to withdraw or suspend
Russian operations. The findings show that the average exposure to Russia of
early announcers is smaller than that of the non-early movers.
The results suggest that a decisive corporate withdrawal from Russia might
not have been just an expression of moral outrage or the result of corporate
leaders’ ethical judgements. Looking at the timing and at revenue exposure,
firms seemed more driven by reputational risk concerns and by an attempt to
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engage in “woke-washing.” In other words, for companies with insignificant
exposure to Russia the announcement to exit the country could represent a
marketing decision to attract positive attention from customers and investors,
rather than a genuine concern for the war in Ukraine. These “marketing” actions
likely put pressure on other firms with larger exposure and higher shareholder
value at stake, which felt forced to make an announcement perhaps earlier than
they would have done in the absence of such pressure.
The descriptive account in Section III of firms’ reactions to the military
assault seems to confirm management’s attempts at woke-washing. First, we
highlight how, despite exceptional public consensus over supporting Ukraine by
sanctioning the Russian economy, pledges claiming the interest of stakeholders
were made by executives to justify not only the decision to leave Russia –
consistent with public opinion and the rationale of governments’ sanctions – but
also the opposite decision, namely to stay in Russia. For instance, some
companies chose to continue to operate in Russia – disregarding the risk of
undermining the premises of governments’ sanctions – claiming the need to
supply essential goods to the population, but then labeled as “essential” products
that clearly could not serve that function (e.g., potato chips and children’s
cosmetics). Additional corporate behaviors documented in our analysis cast
doubt on the authenticity of corporate leaders’ concern for stakeholders.
JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs were praised as the first major banks to
announce their withdrawal from Russia. However, after their announcements,
they continued to trade company bonds tied to Russia until the OFAC forced
them to stop. Significantly, US Senator Elizabeth Warren accused them of
“capitalizing on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and undermining sanctions
imposed on Russian businesses.”162
Our hypothesis is also consistent with some recent literature on the topic. In
particular, one paper presents empirical evidence suggesting that firms’
decisions to withdraw from Russia were determined mainly by reputational
concerns rather than by purely altruistic motives.163 Another study found that
highly rated ESG firms were not more likely to exhibit genuine socially
responsible behavior in response to atrocities committed in Ukraine, claiming
that inferring social responsibility from ESG ratings is “illusory.”164

162 Elizabeth Warren Says Wall Street ‘Undermining’ Russia Sanctions, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 4, 2022),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/R892GCT0AFB4.
163 See Lu & Huang, supra note 55.
164 See Ahmed et al., supra note 55.
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Overall, the evidence from the corporate reaction to the invasion of Ukraine
supports the view that firms’ proclamations of stakeholder-centric behavior do
not necessarily result in actual improvements in treatment of stakeholders.
Instead, many corporate leaders seem to prioritize social objectives not for the
purpose of attaining those social objectives, but because they believe this action
would maximize returns.
B. Stakeholder Pressure
As discussed in Section IV.D, the Twitter-based virality measures reveal a
strong association between boycott campaigns against businesses and their
decision to withdraw from Russia, highlighting the important role that boycott
campaigns played in pressuring companies to exit Russia.
A boycott – together with divestment, vote and engagement with
management – is one of the strategies that stakeholders can adopt to push firms
to act responsibly. Despite increasing calls for action on social media to boycott
companies for social or political reasons, literature and empirical evidence is
limited in terms of corporate boycotting.165 A prominent article finds that exit
campaigns are the most effective instrument to pressure companies to pursue
environmental and social goals in terms of informing and changing people’s
social preferences.166 The reason is that corporate boycotts succeed by affecting
companies’ reputation in the media rather than demand for their products.167 Our
results related to the Twitter campaigns conducted against businesses that
continued to operate in Russia provide empirical evidence in support of this
hypothesis, making an important contribution to the study of corporate boycotts.
Furthermore, the “virality test” has broader implications for the stakeholder
governance debate. It indicates that managers actually face acute pressure from
multiple stakeholders to respond to their social preferences, and that this
pressure can effectively orient business decision-making.168 In addition, it shows
that the list published by Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and the Yale SOM
reinforced boycott campaigns against companies that did not leave Russia,
revealing how academic work can also contribute to the effectiveness of
stakeholder pressure.
165 See Jura Liaukonyte, et. al., Spilling the Beans on Political Consumerism: Do Social Media Boycotts
and Buycotts Translate to Real Sales Impact? (Jan. 11, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4006546 (claiming that
boycott and buycott movements have limited effects on sales).
166 See Broccardo, et al., supra note 43.
167 See also Liaukonyte, et al., supra note 157 (underlining boycott’s limited effectiveness at generating
changes in actual sales outcomes).
168 See Barzuza, et al., supra note 43.

52

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol.10

Finally, it is important to underline that the context we analyzed (i.e., the war
in Ukraine) presents an exceptional public and bipartisan consensus over the
“right thing to do.” This determined a strong convergence of interests across
stakeholder groups which is often not the case, given for instance the political
polarization of our society. Hence, the risk is that when conflicts arise between
competing social values, corporate leaders would resolve them not to maximize
social welfare, but in favor of those stakeholders with more leverage in a
particular situation. Therefore, we believe that stakeholder pressure on
management might be an efficient tool for promoting more responsible
corporations; however, it can only complement − but not substitute −
stakeholder-protecting regulation.
C. “Stakeholder Governance Gap”
Finally, our empirical results draw attention to an issue that is hardly
investigated within the stakeholder governance debate: the difference across
market sizes.
In a recent study, Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili find that between small and
large cap companies exists a stark corporate governance gap (which they term
“The Corporate Governance Gap”).169 While many large, more observable
corporations tend to serve as role models of “good” governance, by contrast in
smaller and less-scrutinized companies, adoption of governance arrangements is
less systematic and often significantly departs from the norms set by larger
firms. Nonetheless, small and mid-sized corporations can still create
significative harm for shareholders, other stakeholders, and society at large. 170
Our research indicates that differences between size categories might also be
overlooked in the stakeholder governance debate.
As described in Section IV.A, our sample consists of S&P 500 and STOXX
600 companies, that include mega-cap (those with a market capitalization of
$200 billon or higher); large-cap (from $10 billion and $200 billion); and midcap companies (from $2 billion to $10 billion).
On the one hand, the results using the Twitter-based boycott campaigns
virality measure, discussed in Section IV.D, show that stakeholders devoted
significantly less attention to smaller companies. On the other hand, the sample

169 See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Corporate Governance Gap, 131 Yale L. J. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3824857.
170 Id.

2022]

CORPORATE RESPONSE TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

53

descriptive statistics show that revenue exposure to Russia is significantly higher
among smaller firms (see Table 2 in Section IV.A). In the framework of the
sanctions imposed on Russia – designed to weaken the Russian government’s
ability to finance the war – companies with larger exposure that continue to
operate in the country are those potentially more helpful for the Russian
economy and, in turn, more harmful for Western countries’ strategy to stop the
war.
The combination of our results suggests the existence of what − inspired by
the above-mentioned paper − we term a “Stakeholder Governance Gap.” We
argue that stakeholder pressure on management can be an effective factor in
achieving a socially desirable outcome, but it tends to focus on large and highprofile companies. Smaller companies, instead – even when they can create
substantial harm to the social interests that stakeholder campaigns aim to protect
– are markedly less scrutinized; hence their corporate leaders are left free to
operate without this meaningful managerial constraint.
CONCLUSIONS
The corporate response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine offers a unique
setting for informing the stakeholder governance debate.
Our empirical analysis shows how − even in the presence of public consensus
around a particular socially responsible action − the risk is that managers could
engage in woke-washing and protect stakeholders only to the extent beneficial
for shareholder value maximization.
The paper also presents the first evidence of the impact of Twitter-based
boycott campaigns to push business leaders to withdraw from Russia, making
an important contribution to the literature on the importance of stakeholder
pressure on firms’ decision to pursue a broader agenda than profit maximization.
Finally, our findings suggest a “Stakeholder Governance Gap.” We show
that stakeholder pressure can effectively orient business decision making
towards responsible governance. However, it markedly focuses on bigger
companies, exempting corporate leaders of smaller companies from this
managerial constraint.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this paper supports the view that
even though private ordering can contribute to more socially responsible
management, external intervention such as legislation, regulation, and policy
design are often critical to protecting stakeholder interests.

